Ex Dono Authoris.

A THIRD LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION.

(4),796

A

THIRD LETTER

CONCERNING

TOLERATION:

In DEFENSE of

The ARGUMENT *of the Letter concerning* TOLERATION, *briefly Consider'd and Answer'd.*

[Jonas Proast]

Imprimatur.

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JONATH. EDWARDS, *Vice-Can. Univ.* OXON.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

In the Marginal References L. p. denotes the Page of the *Letter concerning Toleration*; A. p. the Page of *The Argument of the Letter concerning Toleration, briefly consider'd and answer'd*; and P. the Page of the *Second Letter concerning Toleration.*

TO THE AUTHOR OF THE Second Letter CONCERNING TOLERATION.

SIR,

YOU would have needed no *pardon* for *taking the same Liberty* with me, that I took *with the Author of the Letter concerning Toleration.* But I fear it will be found, that instead of *considering* my *Arguments, and endeavouring to shew* me *the Mistakes of them*, you have taken another sort of *Liberty* which does need *pardon.* P. 1.

You are pleas'd to tell me here in the beginning, that I have *plainly yielded up the Question* to that Author, by *owning that the Severities he would dissuade Christians from, are utterly unapt and improper to bring Men to embrace that Truth which must save them:* As if those *Severities* which I condemn, *viz. Prosecuting Men with Fire and Sword, depriving them of their Estates, maiming them with corporal Punishments, starving and tormenting them in noisome Prisons, taking away their Lives to make them Christians, &c.* were *all* that our Author would *dissuade Christians from:* Whereas you your self own, that *the purpose of his Letter is plainly to defend Toleration* A. p. 12, 13, 14. P. 6.

ration exempt from all Force, from all ſorts and degrees of Penalties whatſoever, even the loweſt and moſt moderate that can be aſſigned. But it is well if this prove to be the greateſt inſtance of the *Liberty* you have taken with me.

P. 1. Whether you, or I have *more carefully and impartially weigh'd the whole matter* in controverſy between us: Whether I do *yet favour ſome Remains of Perſecution*, or not: and, Whether what appears to you *ſo very clear and evident*, be the *Truth*, or not: Of theſe things, Sir, we muſt leave others to judge. But whether it would be *reaſonable and juſt* for *you*, or *me*, *were either of us in Authority, to uſe any Force upon the other, upon any pretence of want of Examination* of our preſent Controverſy, is no part of the Queſtion. For no Man, I ſuppoſe, will pretend that every private Perſon is bound to examine this Controverſy. And therefore how *unreaſonable and unjuſt* ſoever it might be, for either of us to *uſe Force upon the other*, to make him *examine* this Controverſy, it may ſtill be true nevertheleſs, that Authority may *reaſonably and juſtly* uſe ſome degrees of *Force*, where it is needful, to bring Men to conſider and *examine* thoſe Controverſies which they are *bound* to conſider and examine; *i. e.* thoſe, wherein they cannot err, without diſhonouring God, and endangering their own and other Men's eternal Salvation.

P. 2. *The firſt thing*, you ſay, that I *ſeem ſtartled at in the Author's Letter, is the largeneſs of the Toleration he propoſes.* For he claims
A. p. 1. it, as I obſerv'd, not onely for *Chriſtians, in their different Profeſſions of Religion*, but likewiſe for *Jews, Mahumetans, and Pagans*; who, he ſaith, *ought not to be excluded from the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth, becauſe of their Religion.* Now to let me ſee that I ought not to *think this ſtrange*, you put me in mind that *we pray every day for their Converſion*; and you ſay you *think it our Duty ſo to do.* And ſo far I agree with you. But you ſay further, that you *fear it will hardly be believed that we pray in earneſt, if we exclude them from the other ordinary and probable means of Converſion; either by driving them from, or perſecuting them when they are amongſt us.* So that *excluding them from the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth*, is, in your opinion, *driving them from, or perſecuting them when they are amongſt us.* Now I confeſs I thought Men might live quietly enough among us, and enjoy the protection of the Government againſt all violence and injuries, without being *endenizon'd*, or made Members of the *Commonwealth*; which alone can entitle them to the *Civil Rights* and Privileges of it. But

as

as to *Jews*, *Mahumetans*, and *Pagans*, if any of them do not care to live among us, unleſs they may be admitted to the *Rights* and Privileges *of the Commonwealth*; the refuſing them that favour, is not, I ſuppoſe, to be look'd upon as *driving them from us*, or *excluding them from the ordinary and probable means of Converſion*; but as a juſt and neceſſary Caution in a Chriſtian Commonwealth, in reſpect to the Members of it: Who, if ſuch as profeſs *Judaiſm*, or *Mahumetaniſm*, or *Paganiſm*, were permitted to enjoy the ſame Rights with them, would be much the more in danger to be ſeduced by them; ſeeing they would loſe no worldly advantage by ſuch a change of their Religion: Whereas if they could not turn to any of thoſe Religions, without forfeiting the *Civil Rights of the Commonwealth* by doing it; 'tis likely they would conſider well, before they did it, what ground there was to expect that they ſhould get any thing by the exchange, which would countervail the loſs they ſhould ſuſtain by it. And whether this be not a reaſonable and neceſſary Caution, any Man may judge, who does but conſider, within how few Ages after the Floud Superſtition and Idolatry prevail'd over the World; and how apt even God's own peculiar People were to receive that mortal Infection, notwithſtanding all that he did to keep them from it.

If therefore a juſt care of the Flock of Chriſt, requires us to *exclude Jews*, *Mahumetans*, and *Pagans* from the *Civil Rights of the Commonwealth, becauſe of their Religion*; 'tis plain, we may *pray in earneſt for their Converſion*, though we ſo *exclude them*: Becauſe though we are bound to *deſire* their Converſion, and ſo to *pray* for it; yet we are bound to *ſeek* it, no further than we can do it, without endangering the Subjects of Chriſt's Kingdom, to whom he has a ſpecial regard. *Joh.* 17. 9, 15, 20, &c.

But as to *Pagans* particularly, I confeſs I am ſo far from thinking with our Author, that they *ought not to be excluded from the Civil Rights of the Commonwealth, becauſe of their Religion*, that I cannot ſee how their *Religion* can be ſuffer'd by any Commonwealth that knows and worſhips the onely true God, if it would be thought to retain any jealouſy for his honour, or even for that of Humane Nature. For how early or generally ſoever their Idolatries obtain'd in the World, through that blindneſs which Vice brings upon the Minds of men; and how deep rooting ſoever they have taken in it: yet as they are the greateſt Diſhonour conceivable to God Almighty, and to Humane Nature it ſelf; ſo they are utterly incapable of any manner of *excuſe* or extenuation; *Rom.* 1. 20.

being contrary to the natural Senſe and Apprehenſions of Mankind, as God himſelf, in the Prophet, plainly intimates. For
Iſai. 44. 18, 19, 20. and 46. 8. which reaſon at leaſt, I think I might well be *ſtartled* at the *largeneſs* of our Author's Toleration. For whereas you ſay, you *do not ſee why Pagans ſhould not be tolerated as well as others, if we wiſh their Converſion*; whatever may be ſaid for the tolerating of *others*, I think it is plain enough as to *them*, that we ought not to purchaſe the opportunity of *converting* them, by ſuffering them to commit thoſe Indignities and Abominations among us, which they call Religion, till they are *converted*.

But as to the *converting Jews, Mahumetans*, and *Pagans* to Chriſtianity, I fear there will be no great progreſs made in it, till Chriſtians come to a better agreement and union among themſelves. I am ſure our Saviour pray'd that all that ſhould *believe in*
Joh. 17. 20, 21. *him, might be one in the Father and in him* (*i. e.* I ſuppoſe, in that holy Religion which he taught them from the Father) *that the World might believe that the Father had ſent him.* And therefore when he comes to make inquiſition, why no more *Jews, Mahumetans*, and *Pagans* have been converted to his Religion, I very much fear that a great part of the blame will be found to lie upon the Authors and Promoters of Sects and Diviſions among the profeſſors of it: Which therefore I think all that are guilty, and all that would not be guilty, ought well to conſider.

In what ſenſe I allow, that *Force is improper to convert Men to*
A. p. 4. *any Religion*, has already been ſufficiently declared in my *Anſwer*; and I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more of it afterwards.

A. p. 2. Where I ſay that *ſome ſeem to place the advancement of Trade and*
P. 2. *Commerce above all other Conſiderations*, you tell me that if I do not *know that the Author places the advancement of Trade above Religion*, my Inſinuation *is very uncharitable*. But I thought I had ſufficiently prevented ſuch an interpretation of my words, by acquitting the Author but juſt before, of any ill *deſign* towards Religion. That there are ſome Men in the World, who are juſtly ſuſpected of the Crime I mention, I believe you will not deny. And I aſſure you I did not intend, by thoſe words, to bring any Man under the ſuſpicion of it, who has not given juſt cauſe for it.

A. p. 2. I ſay (ſpeaking of the *Toleration which our Author propoſes*) I ſee *no reaſon, from any experiment which has been made, to expect that true Religion would be any way a gainer by it.* And you tell me
P. 2, 3. I have an *experiment of this in the Chriſtian Religion, in its firſt appearance in the World, and ſeveral hundred of years after.* But how does

does that appear? Why, you ſay the Chriſtian Religion was then *better preſerv'd, more widely propagated (in proportion) and render'd more fruitful in the lives of its Profeſſors, than ever ſince; though then Jews and Pagans were tolerated, and more than tolerated, by the Governments of thoſe places where it grew up.* And is this your *Experiment* of the true Religion's being a *gainer by Toleration?* The Chriſtian Religion proſper'd more, you ſay, in thoſe times than ever ſince, *though then Jews and Pagans were tolerated, &c.* and *therefore* it was a *gainer by the Toleration of Jews and Pagans.* Is there any manner of Conſequence in this? That the Chriſtian Religion proſper'd more in thoſe times, than ever ſince, *though* then *Jews* and *Pagans* were tolerated, I readily grant you. But whoever does but underſtand what *though* means, muſt needs ſee that this is ſo far from proving what you inferr from it, that it ſtrongly proves the contrary, *viz.* that the Toleration of Jews and Pagans was rather an *hindrance* than an *advantage* to the Chriſtian Religion.

But let us ſee the utmoſt you can make of this *Experiment* of yours. You ſay you hope I do not *imagine the Chriſtian Religion* P. 3. *has loſt any of its firſt Beauty, Force, or Reaſonableneſs, by having been almoſt 2000 Years in the World; that* I ſhould *fear it ſhould be leſs able now to ſhift for it ſelf, without the help of Force.* And you doubt not but I *look upon it ſtill to be the Power and Wiſdom of God for our Salvation; and therefore cannot ſuſpect it leſs capable to prevail now, by its own Truth and Light, than it was in the firſt Ages of the Church, when poor contemptible Men, without Authority, or the countenance of Authority, had alone the care of it.* In which words I underſtand you to ſay theſe three things; 1. That the Chriſtian Religion prevail'd at firſt meerly by its own *Beauty, Force, or Reaſonableneſs, without the help of Authority, or Force.* 2. That that Religion has ſtill the ſame *Beauty, Force, or Reaſonableneſs* which it had at firſt. 3. Laſtly, that therefore it is now *as well able to ſhift for it ſelf,* and to *prevail, without any aſſiſtance of Authority,* as it was then. Now to clear this matter, I muſt obſerve, that in the *Beauty, Force, or Reaſonableneſs,* by which you ſay the Chriſtian Religion prevail'd at firſt, without the Aſſiſtance of Authority, either you include the *Miracles* done by the *poor contemptible men* you ſpeak of, to make their Religion *prevail;* or you do not. If you do not; then the meaning of your firſt Aſſertion is, that the Chriſtian Religion prevail'd at firſt without the Aſſiſtance of Authority, meerly by the *Beauty, Force, or Reaſonableneſs* which it had,

had, *ſeparate* from thoſe Miracles: Which I believe you will not undertake to defend. But if you do include the Miracles; then your ſecond Aſſertion is manifeſtly falſe: For I am ſure you cannot ſay that the Chriſtian Religion is ſtill accompanied with *Miracles*, as it was at its firſt planting: And ſo the Concluſion you draw from thence, That *therefore the Chriſtian Religion is now as well able to ſhift for it ſelf, and to prevail, without any Aſſiſtance of Authority, as it was at firſt*, falls to the ground.

P. 3. You add, *This, as I take it, has been made uſe of by Chriſtians generally, and by ſome of our Church in particular, as an Argument for the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion, that it grew and ſpread, and prevail'd, without any Aid from Force, or the Aſſiſtance of the Powers in being.* Wherein I hope you are miſtaken: for I am ſure this is a very bad *Argument*. That the Chriſtian Religion, ſo contrary in the nature of it as well to Fleſh and Bloud, as to the Powers of Darkneſs, ſhould *prevail* as it did; and that not onely *without any Aſſiſtance* from *Authority*, but even in ſpight of all the oppoſition which *Authority* and a wicked World, join'd with thoſe infernal Powers, could make againſt it; This, I acknowledge, has deſervedly been inſiſted upon by Chriſtians, as a very good Proof of the Truth of their Religion. But to argue the Truth of the Chriſtian Religion, from its meer *prevailing* in the World, *without any Aid from Force, or the Aſſiſtance of the Powers in being*; as if whatever Religion ſhould ſo *prevail*, muſt needs be the *true Religion*; (whatever may be intended) is really, not to defend the Chriſtian Religion, but to betray it. For neither does the true Religion always *prevail, without the Aſſiſtance of the Powers in being*; nor is that always the *true Religion*, which does ſo *ſpread* and *prevail*: As I doubt not but you will acknowledge with me, when you have but conſider'd, within how few Generations after the Floud, the Worſhip of Falſe Gods prevail'd againſt the Religion which *Noah* profeſs'd, and taught his Children (which was undoubtedly the true Religion) almoſt to the utter excluſion of it (though that at firſt was the onely Religion in the World) *without any Aid from Force*, or the *Aſſiſtance of the Powers in being*, for any thing we find in the Hiſtory of thoſe Times, and as we may reaſonably believe, conſidering that it found an entrance into the World, and entertainment in it, when it could have no ſuch *Aid*, or *Aſſiſtance*. Of which (beſides the Corruption of Humane Nature) I ſuppoſe there can no other Cauſe be aſſigned, or none more probable than this, that the *Powers* then *in being*, did not do what

what they might and ought to have done, towards the preventing, or checking that horrible Apoſtaſy.

You go on: *And if it be a mark of the true Religion, that it will prevail by its own Light and Strength; (but that falſe Religions will not, but have need of Force and foreign Helps to ſupport them) nothing certainly can be more for the advantage of true Religion, than to take away Compulſion every where.* But if this be not *a mark of the true Religion* (as you have not proved it to be;) then what you conclude here, may not be true. That the true Religion has always *Light and Strength* of its *own*, ſufficient to prevail with all that conſider it ſeriouſly, and without Prejudice, I readily grant. But if, when you make it *a mark of the true Religion*, that it will *prevail by its own Light and Strength*, you mean (as it is plain you muſt) that it will always prevail in the World againſt other Religions, *meerly* by its own Light and Strength, without the Aſſiſtance either of *Miracles*, or of *Authority;* then I muſt tell you, that *prevailing by its own Light and Strength*, is ſo far from being a *mark of the true Religion*, that it is not *true*, that the *true Religion* will *ſo prevail* by its own *Light and Strength*. The Inſtance but now given, is too great a proof of this. For if you admit that *Noah*'s Religion was the *true Religion*, you muſt admit like wiſe that it had *Light and Strength* enough to *prevail* with all that ſhould but fairly conſider it. And yet, however, we find that it was ſo far from prevailing againſt falſe Religions, without *foreign Help*, that though at firſt it had quiet poſſeſſion of the World, without any falſe Religion to conteſt its Title; yet it did not long maintain its advantage, but notwithſtanding all its *Light* and *Strength*, was within a few Generations, almoſt extinguiſh'd and loſt out of the World: Idolatry prevailing againſt it, not by its own *Light and Strength*, you may be ſure, (for it could have nothing of either;) nor yet by the *help of Force*, as has already been ſhew'd; but meerly by the advantage which it had in the Corruption and Pravity of Humane Nature, left (as it is moſt reaſonable to ſuppoſe) to it ſelf, unbridled by *Authority*. For to the corrupt Nature of Man, falſe Religions are ever more agreeable than the true. For whatever Hardſhips ſome falſe Religions may impoſe; it will however always be eaſier to carnal and worldly-minded men, to give even *their firſt-born for their Tranſgreſſions*, than to mortify the Luſts from which they ſpring: which no Religion but the true, requires of them. And upon this account, though there is nothing more certain than that falſe Religions P. 3.

ligions will never prevail *by their own Light and Strength*; yet it seems contrary to Reason (as well as to Experience) to say that they always *have need of Force and foreign Helps to support them.* On the contrary, I see no reason to doubt, but the meer Agreeableness of false Religions to Flesh and Bloud, may very well *support* them, without *foreign Helps*; whilest the true Religion may stand in need of them, not for any defects of its own, but by reason of the Folly, Perverseness, and Wickedness of Men. If therefore it be no *mark of the true Religion, that it will prevail by its own Light and Strength, but that false Religions will not, but have need of Force and foreign Helps to support them* (as you have not proved it is, and I think I have proved it is far from being so;) then it does not yet appear, that *nothing can be more for the advantage of the true Religion, than to take away Compulsion every where.*

P. 3. You say, *A Religion that is of God wants not the Assistance of Humane Authority to make it prevail.* Which is not simply, or always true. Indeed when God takes the matter wholly into his own hands; as he does at his first revealing and planting a Religion; there can then be no need of the *Assistance of Humane Authority:* because then, to make such a Religion appear to be his, God himself does all that is requisite to *make it prevail.* But when once God has sufficiently settled his Religion in the World, so that if Men will but thenceforth do what they may and ought, in their several Capacities, to preserve and propagate it, it may subsist and prevail without that extraordinary Assistance from him which was necessary for its first establishment: then he leaves it to their care, under his ordinary Providence, to try whether they will do their Duties, or not: leaving them answerable for all that may follow from their neglect. And then, if that Religion will not prevail without the Assistance of *Humane Authority*, it cannot be said not to *need that Assistance to make it prevail.*

P. 3. *I guess*, say you, *when this dropp'd from you, you had narrow'd your Thoughts to your own Age and Country: But if you will enlarge them a little beyond the Confines of* England, *I do not doubt but you will easily imagine that if in* Italy, Spain, Portugal, &c. *the Inquisition, and in* France *their Dragooning; and in other parts those Severities that are used to keep or force men to the National Religion, were taken away; and instead thereof the Toleration proposed by the Author were set up, the true Religion would be a gainer by it.* How easily soever I can *imagine* that, in this case, the true Religion would, for some time, be a *gainer* by our Author's *Toleration*; because

cauſe then it would be tolerated in *Italy*, *Spain*, *Portugal*, *France*, *&c.* where now it is not: Yet I think it is manifeſt enough that it does not follow from thence, that in *England*, or wherever elſe the true Religion is Nationally received, it would reap any advantage by having its preſent Eſtabliſhment taken away, and our *Author's*, *i.e.* an *univerſal Toleration* of Religions *ſet up* inſtead of it.

But I ſuppoſe your meaning is, that if all the World would agree to ſuch a Toleration; though then the true Religion would loſe by it in thoſe few places where it is now eſtabliſh'd as the National Religion; yet upon the whole matter, it would be a *gainer* by the bargain; becauſe then it would ſtand upon even terms with all other Religions, in ſo many more places, where now it is either not at all ſuffer'd, or at leaſt under great diſadvantages.

If this be the thing you aim at: then, 1. I ſuppoſe you do not hope you ſhall perſwade the whole World to conſent in your Toleration, or that you ſhall prevail with Pagans, Mahumetans, and Papiſts every where to allow true and ſound Religion the ſame terms with their own, (ſuppoſing you could prevail with thoſe of that Religion, to do this to them.) And if that Religion alone ſhould tolerate all other Religions, whileſt it ſelf is tolerated by none; I think it is not eaſy to conceive how it would be a *gainer* by ſo doing. But, 2. Suppoſing your Toleration were *ſet up* all the World over: Even in that caſe, it is ſo far from being probable that the true Religion would be any way advantaged by it, that on the contrary I think there is great reaſon to fear, that, without God's extraordinary Providence, it would in a much ſhorter time than any one that does not well conſider the matter would imagine, be moſt effectually extirpated by it throughout the World: Conſidering (what has already been obſerv'd) that even when the true Religion was the onely Religion in the World, it did not long continue ſo, but the depraved Nature of Man ſoon found out other Religions, more agreeable to it ſelf, which quickly prevail'd, and overſpread the World.

As to the *Inquiſition*, *Dragooning*, or any other ſuch *Severities*, which are any where uſed, to *keep or force men to the National Religion*, I ſuppoſe I need not put you in mind that I condemn them as much as you do.

You tell me the Author of the Letter ſays, *Truth will do well enough, if ſhe were once left to ſhift for her ſelf.* (The contrary P. 4.

whereof has been ſufficiently ſhewn.) *She ſeldom has receiv'd, and he fears never will receive much Aſſiſtance from the Power of great men, to whom ſhe is but rarely known, and more rarely welcome.* (And yet God himſelf foretold and promiſed that *Kings* ſhould be *nurſing Fathers*, and *Queens nurſing Mothers* to his Church: As I doubt they cannot be, if *Truth* does not *receive Aſſiſtance from their Power.*) *Errors indeed prevail by the Aſſiſtance of foreign and borrow'd Succours.* (And without it too.) *Truth makes way into our Underſtanding by her own Light, and is but the weaker for any borrow'd Force that Violence can add to her.* (Yet moderate Penalties may *make way* for Truth *to* men's *Underſtanding*, that ſo ſhe may make way *into* it *by her own Light.*) And then you add, *Theſe words of his (how hard ſoever they may ſeem to you) may help you to conceive how he ſhould think to do ſervice to true Religion, by recommending and perſwading ſuch a Toleration as he propoſed. And now,* you go on, *pray tell me your ſelf, whether you do not think true Religion would be a gainer by it, if ſuch a Toleration eſtabliſh'd there, would permit the Doctrine of the Church of* England *to be freely preach'd, and its Worſhip ſet up in any Popiſh, Mahumetan, or Pagan Country?* Sir, I have told you already, that I think it would, for a time; though I think withall, that an univerſal Toleration would ruine it both there and every where elſe in the end. And I have told you why I think ſo.

P. 4. You add, *If you do not, you have a very ill Opinion of the Religion of the Church of* England, *and muſt own that it can onely be propagated and ſupported by Force.* But why may not I have as good an Opinion of the Religion of the Church of *England*, as I have of *Noah*'s Religion, notwithſtanding that I think it cannot now be propagated and ſupported, without uſing ſome kinds or degrees of Force?

P. 4. *If*, ſay you, *you think it would gain in thoſe Countries, by ſuch a Toleration, you are then of the Author's mind.* Not ſo, Sir: For as I fear it would loſe all at laſt by ſuch a Toleration; ſo I doubt not but at preſent it would loſe vaſtly more by it, where it is now Nationally received, than it would gain, where falſe or unſound Religions are ſo received.

P. 4. *But*, ſay you, *if you allow ſuch a Toleration uſeful to Truth in other Countries, you muſt find ſomething very peculiar in the Air, that muſt make it leſs uſeful to Truth in* England. *And 'twill ſavour of much partiality, and be too abſurd, I fear, for you to own, that Toleration will be advantageous to true Religion all the World over, except onely in this Iſland; Though I much ſuſpect, this, as abſurd as*

it

it is, lies at the bottom; And you build all you ſay upon this lurking Suppoſition, that the National Religion now in England, *back'd by the Publick Authority of the Law, is the onely true Religion, and therefore no other is to be tolerated.* How *uſeful to Truth,* or *advantangeous to true Religion* I think Toleration would be *in other Countries,* or *all the World over,* I ſuppoſe I have by this time ſufficiently declared. But why you ſhould ſuſpect that I look upon this *Iſland* as the onely part of the World that would receive no advantage by it, I cannot imagine. If you will take my word for it, I aſſure you I think there are many other Countries in the World, where (whatever their *Air* be) your *Toleration* would be as little *uſeful to Truth,* as in *England.* For notwithſtanding the *lurking Suppoſition* you ſpeak of, I am far enough from thinking that the true Religion is confined to this *Kingdom,* or this *Iſland.*

But as to my *ſuppoſing* that the *National Religion now in* England, *back'd by the Publick Authority of the Law,* is the *onely true Religion;* if you own, with our Author, that there is but *one* true Religion, I cannot ſee how you your ſelf can avoid *ſuppoſing* the ſame. For you own your ſelf of the Church of *England;* and conſequently you own the *National Religion now in* England, to be *the true Religion;* for that is her Religion. And therefore if you believe there is but *one* true Religion; there is no help for it, but you muſt ſuppoſe, with me, that the *National Religion now in* England, *back'd with the Publick Authority of the Law, is the onely true Religion.* L. *p.* 9. 13, 24. *P.* 35.

But this is not all the *lurking Suppoſition* you ſpeak of. For you ſuſpect me likewiſe to *ſuppoſe,* that *no other Religion is to be tolerated.* By which if you mean, that as this onely true Religion ought to be received wherever it is preach'd; ſo, where-ever it is receiv'd, I *ſuppoſe* all other Religions ought to be diſcouraged in ſome meaſure, by the Civil Powers; I own that I do *ſuppoſe* it: And I think I have ſhewn good reaſon why.

But you go on, and (ſpeaking of this *lurking Suppoſition,* That *the National Religion now in* England, *is the onely true Religion, and therefore no other is to be tolerated*) you ſay, *Which being a Suppoſition equally unavoidable, and equally juſt in other Countries (unleſs we can imagine that every where but in* England *men believe what at the ſame time they think to be a Lie) will in other places exclude Toleration, and thereby hinder Truth from the means of propagating it ſelf.* How, Sir? Is this Suppoſition *equally unavoidable;* and *equally juſt in other Countries,* where falſe Religions are the National *P.* 4.

tional Religion? (For that you muſt mean, or nothing to the purpoſe.) If ſo, then I fear it will be equally *true* too, and equally *rational*. For otherwiſe I ſee not how it can be either *equally unavoidable*, or *equally juſt*: For if it be not equally *true*, it cannot be *equally juſt*; and if it be not equally *rational*, it cannot be *equally unavoidable*. But if it be *equally true*, and *equally rational*; then either *all* Religions are true, or *none* is true: For if they be all *equally* true, and any one of them be *not* true; then *none* of them can be true. And then the leaſt that will follow is, that we muſt *unſuppoſe* again, what we *ſuppoſed* but now, *viz.* that the Religion now eſtabliſh'd in *England* is the *onely true Religion*. For whether we admit that *all* Religions are true, or that *none* is true; we muſt unavoidably admit that there is no *onely true Religion*: And if there be no onely true Religion; then neither the Religion now eſtabliſh'd in *England*, nor any other can be the *onely true Religion*. There is therefore no remedy, but you muſt either recall this Aſſertion of yours, or own theſe Conſequences which flow from it.

But I hope, when you have thought a little more of the matter, you will be ſo far from aſſerting that the Suppoſition, *that the National Religion is the onely true Religion*, is in all Countries *equally unavoidable, and equally juſt*, that you will acknowledge that it cannot be *at all unavoidable*, or *juſt*, where any falſe Religion is the National Religion. Otherwiſe, you will be forced to own that men may be bound to embrace falſe Religions. For whatever Religion any man does *unavoidably*, and *juſtly ſuppoſe*, or judge, to be *the onely true Religion*, that Religion he muſt needs be bound to embrace: becauſe he has all the reaſon to embrace it, which any man can have for embracing any Religion whatſoever; and he can no more reaſonably reject it, than any other man may reject the onely true Religion.

Now if this *Suppoſition*, that *the National is the onely true Religion*, be indeed neither *equally unavoidable*, nor *equally juſt* in *other Countries*, as it is where the True is the National Religion; then neither will the Suppoſition, that therefore *no other Religion is to be tolerated*, be either *equally unavoidable*, or *equally juſt* in other Countries, as it is where the True is the National Religion. And therefore if this *Suppoſition* ſhall any where *exclude* the Toleration of the Truth, and *thereby hinder it from the means of propagating it ſelf*; the blame will lie upon thoſe who admit that Suppoſition, where there is no juſt ground for it: who therefore muſt anſwer for the Conſequences of it.

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The *Toleration* the *Fruits* whereof I ſay *give no encouragement to hope for any advantage from* our Author's *Toleration, to true Religion*, is that (as I thought you would eaſily have gueſs'd) which almoſt all, but thoſe of the Church of *England*, enjoyed in the times of the *Bleſſed Reformation*, as it was call'd. And for the *Fruits* of it, *viz.* the *Sects* and *Hereſies* which it produced (*ſome of which* I ſay *ſtill remain with us*) how numerous, and of what quality they were, ſome yet living remember, and the Writers of thoſe times do ſufficiently diſcover. P. 4, 5. A. p. 2. *See Mr.* Edwards's Gangræna.

But here, whatever the *Fruits* of that *Toleration* were, you *boldly ſay, that if the Magiſtrates will ſeverely and impartially ſet themſelves againſt Vice, in whomſoever it is found; and leave men to their own Conſciences, in their Articles of Faith, and Ways of Worſhip; true Religion will be ſpread wider, and be more fruitful in the Lives of its Profeſſors, than ever hitherto it has been, by the impoſition of Creeds and Ceremonies.* It ſeems then, with you, the rejecting the true *Faith*, and the refuſing to worſhip God in decent *Ways*, preſcribed by thoſe to whom God has left the ordering of ſuch matters, are not comprehended in the name of *Vice*. Otherwiſe you muſt allow the Magiſtrates to *ſet themſelves againſt* theſe things likewiſe, if they muſt *ſeverely and impartially ſet themſelves againſt Vice:* which would not conſiſt with *leaving men to their own Conſciences* in them. But if *you* except theſe things, and will not allow them to be call'd by the name of *Vice;* perhaps other men may think it as reaſonable to except ſome other things, which they have a kindneſs for. For inſtance: Some perhaps may except *arbitrary Divorcing*, others *Polygamy*, others *Concubinacy*, others *ſimple Fornication*, other *Marrying* within *Degrees* which have hitherto been thought *forbidden*. And all theſe, it may be, will *boldly ſay* too, that *if the Magiſtrates will ſeverely and impartially ſet themſelves againſt Vice, and leave men to their own Conſciences in theſe things;* Vertue *and* good Manners *would be ſpread wider*, and ſhine more gloriouſly in the *Lives* of men, *than ever hitherto it has done*, by the help of any Laws that have been made about theſe matters. P. 5.

But, Sir, whether the Magiſtrates *ſetting themſelves ſeverely and impartially againſt* what I ſuppoſe you call *Vice;* or the *impoſition of* ſound *Creeds and* decent *Ceremonies*, does more conduce to the *ſpreading true Religion*, and *rendering it fruitful in the Lives of its Profeſſours*, we need not examine. I confeſs I think both together do beſt. And this I think is as much as needs to be ſaid to your next Paragraph alſo.

As

As to what our Author offers in behalf of the Toleration he
A. p. 3. contends for, I thought the whole *Strength* of it comprized in this Argument:

'There is but one Way of Salvation, or but one true Religion.

'No man can be ſaved by this Religion, who does not believe it 'to be the true Religion.

'This Belief is to be wrought in men by Reaſon and Argument, 'not by outward Force and Compulſion.

'Therefore all ſuch Force is utterly of no uſe for the promo-'ting true Religion, and the Salvation of Souls.

'And therefore no body can have any Right to uſe any Force 'or Compulſion, for the bringing men to the true Religion: nei-'ther any Private Perſon; nor any Eccleſiaſtical Officer (Biſhop, 'Prieſt, or other;) nor any Church, or Religious Society; nor the 'Civil Magiſtrate.

P. 6. But to this you ſay, *If it be a true Conſequence, that men muſt be tolerated, if Magiſtrates have no Commiſſion or Authority to puniſh them for Matters of Religion; then the onely Strength of that Letter lies not in the unfitneſs of Force to convince Men's Underſtanding. Vid. Lett. p.* 7. But if all the Reaſon for which the Author denies that Magiſtrates have any *Commiſſion or Authority to puniſh for Matters of Religion*, ends in the *unfitneſs of Force to convince Men's Underſtanding* (as, upon examination, it will appear it does;) then the *onely Strength of that Letter* may *lie in* that, notwithſtanding that *true Conſequence*. 'Tis true indeed, the Author does ſay, in the Page you quote, that *it does not appear that God has given any ſuch Authority to one man over another, as to compell any one to his Religion:* Wherein, I believe, no ſober man will contradict him. But (ſuppoſing that by *compelling any one to his Religion*, he means uſing any degree of Force, in any manner whatſoever, to bring any one to his Religion;) What Reaſon, I beſeech you, does he any where offer for his ſaying this, but that
L. p. 8. which he gives us in the next Page; where he expreſly affirms that the Magiſtrate's Power *extends not to the eſtabliſhing any Articles of Faith, or Forms of Worſhip, by the Force of his Laws*, for this reaſon, *viz.* becauſe *Laws are of no force at all without Penalties, and Penalties in this caſe are abſolutely impertinent, becauſe they are not proper to convince the Mind*, becauſe they are *no way capable to produce the Belief of the Truth of any Articles of Faith, or of the acceptableneſs to God of any outward Forms of Worſhip;* and becauſe that *Light and Evidence which onely can work a change in Men's*

Men's Opinions, can in no manner proceed from them: Which I ſuppoſe you will acknowledge to be onely ſo many ſeveral Expreſſions of the *unfitneſs of Force to convince men's Underſtanding.*

Again, ſay you; *If it be true that Magiſtrates being as liable to Error as the reſt of Mankind, their uſing of Force in matters of Religion, would not at all advance the Salvation of Mankind, (allowing that even Force could work upon them, and Magiſtrates had Authority to uſe it in Religion) then the Argument you mention, is not the onely one in that Letter, of ſtrength to prove the neceſſity of Toleration. Vid. Let. p.* 8. P. 6. But you might have conſider'd, that this Argument, from the *Magiſtrate's being as liable to Error as the reſt of Mankind,* concerns none but thoſe, who aſſert that every Magiſtrate has a Right to uſe Force to promote his own Religion, whatever it be: Which I think no man that has any Religion will aſſert: And that for this reaſon, I could not be obliged to conſider it as a diſtinct Argument. However, where it came in my way, I took as much notice of it as I thought it deſerved. A. p. 24, 25, 26.

As to the *Argument* as I have repreſented it, you deny that the *Fourth Propoſition is any Propoſition of the Author's, to be found in the Pages* I quote, *or any where elſe in the whole Letter, either in thoſe terms, or in the ſenſe* I take it in. And yet you immediately add, that *in the eighth Page,* which I quote, *the Author is ſhewing that the Magiſtrate has no Right to make uſe of Force in Matters of Religion, for the Salvation of men's Souls;* And that *the Reaſon he there gives for it is, becauſe Force hath no efficacy to convince men's Minds; and that without a full perſwaſion of the Mind, the Profeſſion of the true Religion it ſelf is not acceptable to God.* And then you ſet down the words of the Author to which I referr, *viz. Upon this ground I affirm that the Magiſtrate's Power extends not to the eſtabliſhing any Articles of Faith, or Forms of Worſhip, by the force of his Laws. For Laws are of no force without Penalties; and Penalties in this caſe are abſolutely impertinent, becauſe they are not proper to convince the Mind.* Now in what reſpect, I beſeech you, are *Penalties* here affirm'd to be *abſolutely impertinent?* Is it not plain that the Author means they are ſo, as uſed to bring men to believe *any Articles of Faith,* or to approve *any Forms of Worſhip?* And is not this exactly the *Senſe* of the *Fourth Propoſition?* The other place of the Letter, p. 27. to which I referr, and which you here ſet down, does clearly enough contain the ſame Senſe; and therefore I need not add any more words concerning it. P. 6.

You add, *But in neither of thoſe Paſſages, nor any where elſe* P. 7.

that

that I remember, does the Author ſay that it is impoſſible that Force ſhould any way, at any time, upon any Perſon, by any Accident, be uſeful towards the promoting of true Religion, and the Salvation of Souls; for that is it which you mean by utterly of no uſe. By *utterly of no uſe*, I mean the ſame thing which the Author does by *abſolutely impertinent*. And whether he does, or does not *ſay that it is impoſſible, &c.* I am ſure the leaſt he can mean by ſaying that *Penalties are abſolutely impertinent*, is, that they are ſo little ſerviceable towards the purpoſe we ſpeak of, that, generally ſpeaking, they do at leaſt as much harm as good: For nothing leſs than that can make them *abſolutely impertinent:* And that is all that I mean by *utterly uſeleſs*.

P. 7. You ſay further; *He does not deny that there is any thing which God in his Goodneſs does not, or may not ſometimes gratiouſly make uſe of towards the Salvation of men's Souls (as our Saviour did of Clay and Spittle to cure Blindneſs:) and that ſo, Force alſo may be ſometimes uſeful. But that which he denies, and you grant, is that Force has any proper Efficacy to enlighten the Underſtanding, or produce Belief. And from thence he inferrs, that therefore the Magiſtrate cannot lawfully compell men in Matters of Religion.* 'Tis true indeed, I do grant that Force has no *proper Efficacy to enlighten or convince the Underſtanding*, or to do the work of *Reaſon* and *Arguments*. But muſt it needs be *utterly uſeleſs*, or no otherwiſe *uſeful* for the promoting true Religion, than *Clay* and *Spittle* are for curing *Blindneſs*, unleſs it have the *Efficacy* of *Reaſon* and *Arguments?* I confeſs I thought the *uſefulneſs* of Force for the promoting the true Religion, would ſufficiently appear, if it could but be ſhewn to be capable of doing any conſiderable ſervice that way, by *procuring* the Conviction of the Underſtanding, though it be not it ſelf capable to *convince*. For certainly it is one thing to *convince* the Underſtanding, and another to *procure* its Conviction. The one indeed is peculiarly the work of *Reaſon* and *Arguments:* but the other is done by whatever prevails with a man to *conſider* and weigh thoſe Reaſons and Arguments which do convince his Underſtanding; whether it be his own Inclination, or the Advice of a Friend, or the Command or Law of a Superior. Now though I grant that Force has no *proper Efficacy to enlighten the Underſtanding, or produce Belief:* yet I aſſert withall, that it has a *proper Efficacy* (*i.e.* not a bare *obediential* Efficacy, ſuch as *Clay* and *Spittle* have in the hand of Omnipotence; but a *natural* Efficacy, as a Moral Cauſe) to *procure* the *enlightening of*

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the Underſtanding, and the *production of Belief*. And if it be in this ſort *uſeful* for the promoting true Religion, and the Salvation of Souls, (as I ſee no reaſon hitherto to doubt but it is;) then it may ſtill be *lawful* for the Magiſtrate to make uſe of it *in matters of Religion*, though it has no *proper Efficacy to enlighten the Underſtanding, or produce Belief*.

Where I ſay that *Force may indirectly and at a diſtance do ſome ſervice &c.* you ſay you do not underſtand what I mean by *doing ſervice at a diſtance towards the bringing men to Salvation, or to embrace Truth; unleſs perhaps it be what others, in propriety of Speech, call by Accident*. But I make little doubt but all other men that read the place, do well enough underſtand what I mean by thoſe words; even ſuch as do not underſtand what it is to *do ſervice by Accident*. And if by *doing ſervice by Accident*, you mean doing it but *ſeldom*, and *beſide the intention of the Agent*; I aſſure you that is not the thing that I mean, when I ſay *Force may indirectly and at a diſtance do ſome ſervice*. For in that uſe of Force which I defend, the Effect is both *intended* by him that uſes it, and withall, I doubt not, ſo *often* attain'd, as abundantly to manifeſt the Uſefulneſs of it. A. p. 5. P. 7.

But be it what it will, ſay you, *it is ſuch a ſervice as cannot be aſſcribed to the direct and proper Efficacy of Force. And ſo, ſay you, Force indirectly and at a diſtance, may do ſome ſervice. I grant it: Make your beſt of it. What do you conclude from thence? That therefore the Magiſtrate may make uſe of it? That I deny. That ſuch an indirect and at a diſtance Uſefulneſs will authorize the Civil Power in the uſe of it, that will never be proved.* It ſeems then you grant at laſt, that Force *may, indirectly, and at a diſtance, do ſome ſervice*, in the matter we are ſpeaking of. But where, I beſeech you, do I affirm, that *therefore the Magiſtrate may make uſe of it?* Methinks you might remember, that I aſſert Force to be generally *neceſſary*, as well as *uſeful*, to bring erring Perſons to the way of Truth: and that accordingly I ground the Magiſtrate's Authority to uſe Force for that purpoſe, upon the *Neceſſity*, as well as *Uſefulneſs* of it. Now whether ſuch an *indirect and at a diſtance Uſefulneſs* (as you are pleas'd to call it) together with a *general Neceſſity* of Force, will not *authorize the Civil Power in the uſe of it*, you will perhaps be better able to judge, when you have anſwer'd a plain Queſtion or two. P. 7. A. p. 10, 11, 12, 15, 16.

That Force does ſome ſervice toward the making of Scholars and Artiſts, I ſuppoſe you will eaſily grant. Give me leave there-

fore to ask, How it does it? I ſuppoſe you will ſay, Not by its *direct and proper Efficacy*, (for Force is no more capable to work Learning, or Arts, than the Belief of the true Religion, in men, by its *direct and proper Efficacy;*) but by prevailing upon thoſe who are deſigned for Scholars, or Artiſts, to receive Inſtruction, and to apply themſelves to the uſe of thoſe Means and Helps, which are proper to make them what they are deſigned to be: That is, it does it *indirectly, and at a diſtance*. Well then; If all the Uſefulneſs of Force towards the bringing Scholars, or Apprentices, to the Learning, or Skill they are deſigned to attain, be onely an *indirect and at a diſtance Uſefulneſs:* I pray, what is it that warrants and *authorizes* Schoolmaſters, Tutours, or Maſters, to uſe Force upon their Scholars, or Apprentices, to bring them to Learning, or to the Skill of their Arts and Trades, if ſuch an *indirect and at a diſtance Uſefulneſs* of Force, together with that *Neceſſity* of it which Experience diſcovers, will not do it? I believe you will acknowledge, that even ſuch an Uſefulneſs, together with that Neceſſity, will ſerve the turn in theſe caſes. But then I would fain know, why the ſame kind of Uſefulneſs, join'd with the like Neceſſity, will not as well do it in the caſe before us. I confeſs I ſee no reaſon why it ſhould not: nor do I believe you can aſſign any.

That the Magiſtrate may make uſe of whatſoever God has at
P. 8. any time *made the occaſions of good to men;* or of whatſoever may
P. 7. *indirectly and at a diſtance*, or (as you ſpeak before) may *any way, at any time, upon any Perſon, by any Accident, be uſeful towards the promoting of true Religion;* This I do no where aſſert. And therefore you might have ſpared the Inſtances by which you prove the contrary. There is no doubt but God, who can do what he pleaſes, by what means he pleaſes, and even without any means, can make many things *occaſions of good* to men, which are not apt in their own natures to be ſo. Nor do I doubt but ſometimes, what in his infinite Wiſdom he ſees would be hurtful and pernicious to all other men, he ſees will be good and ſalutary to ſome particular perſons, and accordingly in his Goodneſs orders it for them. But if men ſhould thence take occaſion to apply ſuch things generally; Who ſees not, that however they might chance to hit right in ſome few caſes; yet upon the whole matter, they would certainly
P. 8. do a great deal more harm than good? And *in all Pleas*, as you tell us, *for any thing becauſe of its Uſefulneſs, it is not enough to ſay that it may be ſerviceable; But it muſt be conſider'd, not onely what*

it

it may, but what it is likely to produce: And the greater Good or Harm like to come from it, ought to determine the uſe of it. And therefore I can eaſily grant you, that as *Running a man through*, though once upon a time it chanced to *ſave a man's life by opening a lurking Impoſtume*, is nevertheleſs no *lawful or juſtifiable Chirurgery;* becauſe it is always much more likely to let out men's lives, than to *open lurking Impoſtumes:* So though *Loſs of Eſtate, &c. the Gallies, and the Torments ſuffer'd in the late Perſecution*, might poſſibly, as directed and managed by divine Providence, bring ſome Perſons to *Repentance, Sobriety of Thought, and a true ſenſe of Religion, &c.* and ſo *indirectly and at a diſtance ſerve to the Salvation of their Souls:* Yet ſince conſider'd in themſelves, and with reſpect to the generality of men, theſe Methods, for the reaſons alleged in my *Anſwer*, are juſtly to be look'd upon as more apt to hinder, than to promote that end; the Succeſs which God was *pleas'd* perhaps, but not *bound* to give them, will by no means juſtify them, or prove that the *French King had Right and Authority to make uſe of them.* This, I ſay, I can eaſily grant you. But how will this ſerve your purpoſe? Will it follow from hence, that the Magiſtrate has no Right to uſe any Force at all, for the bringing men to the true Religion? Or will any man ſay, that becauſe the Magiſtrate may not uſe thoſe *Severities* which are more apt to *hinder*, than to *promote* true Religion, therefore he can uſe no *lower Penalties*, though they be never ſo *fit* and *ſerviceable* to promote it? If you ſay you think no Penalties at all are fit to promote Religion: to make me of your opinion, you muſt prove it ſome other way, than by alleging the unfitneſs of thoſe *Severities*. This, I ſuppoſe, may ſerve to ſhew with how little reaſon you ſay here, that if my *indirect and at a diſtance Serviceableneſs may authorize the Magiſtrate to uſe Force in Religion, all the Cruelties uſed by the Heathens againſt Chriſtians, by Papiſts againſt Proteſtants, and all the perſecuting of Chriſtians one amongſt another, are all juſtifiable.* (Not to take notice at preſent, how odly it ſounds, that that which authorizes the Magiſtrate to uſe *moderate Penalties*, to promote the *true Religion*, ſhould juſtify all the *Cruelties* that ever were uſed, to promote *Heatheniſm*, or *Popery*.)

A. p. 13, 14.

With what Ingenuity you draw me in, to condemn Force in general, onely becauſe I acknowledge the ill *Effects* of proſecuting men with *Fire and Sword, &c. to make them Chriſtians*, I think I may now leave every man to judge.

P. 8, 9.

But you ſay I *ſhelter* my ſelf *under the name of Severities*. *For*,

P. 9, 10.

ſay you, *moderate Puniſhments, as you call them in another place, (Penalties*, Sir, is my word: But ſince you ſay 'tis *Puniſhments*, let it be ſo: Theſe) *you think may be ſerviceable, indirectly, and at a diſtance ſerviceable, to bring men to the Truth. And I ſay, any ſort of Puniſhments diſproportion'd to the Offenſe, or where there is no fault at all, will always be Severity, unjuſtifiable Severity, and will be thought ſo by the Sufferers, and By-ſtanders, &c.* Well, Sir: And what then? Why, *not to profeſs the National Faith, whileſt one believes it not to be true; not to enter into Church-Communion with the Magiſtrate, as long as one judges the Doctrine there profeſs'd to be erroneous, or the Worſhip not ſuch as God hath preſcribed, or will accept; this you allow, and all the World with you muſt allow, not to be a fault. But yet you would have men puniſh'd for not being of the National Religion; that is, as you your ſelf confeſs, for no fault at all.* In which words you *take a liberty* to put upon me what you pleaſe. For I neither *allow*, nor *confeſs*, nor *would have*, what you are pleas'd to impute to me. But how far that is to be *allow'd*, which you *ſay* I do *allow*, *and all the World* with me *muſt allow*, will quickly appear.

For (to come to the Point;) the *National Religion* is either true, or not true. If it be not true, no man is bound to *believe* it: And it is no *fault* in him that is not bound to believe it, not to *profeſs* it. If it be true; then either there is ſufficient proviſion made for inſtructing men in the truth of it, or there is not. If there be not; then all men are not bound to *believe* it; And (as was ſaid before) in thoſe who are not bound to believe it, it will be no *fault* not to profeſs it. But if there be ſufficient means of Inſtruction provided for all; then it muſt be a *fault* in all not to *profeſs* it; becauſe, in that caſe, it is a *fault* in all not to *believe* it. And the like is to be ſaid concerning *Communion with the Magiſtrate in Divine Worſhip.*

This I take to be very plain. And from hence theſe two things will unavoidably follow. 1. That no man ought to be puniſh'd for not being of any falſe Religion, though it be the *National Religion:* Becauſe it is no *fault* not to be of any falſe Religion. 2. That all who have ſufficient means of Inſtruction provided for them, may juſtly be puniſh'd for not being of the *National Religion*, where the true, is the National Religion: Becauſe it is a *fault* in all ſuch, not to be of that Religion. And ſo *all Puniſhment* for the ſake of Religion, will not be *unjuſtifiable Severity.*

P. 10. For though, *where there is no Fault, there can be no moderate Puniſh-*

niſhment; yet all Puniſhment is not *immoderate,* where there is a Fault to be puniſh'd. Now that which I *would have,* is, that this *Fault* ſhould be *puniſh'd;* but ſo far onely, as may beſt, and moſt generally ſerve to correct it, *i.e.* in my opinion, with Penalties below the rate of the Puniſhments before mention'd. Which I think you have not yet proved to be *unjuſtifiable Severity.*

The *taking away men's lives to make them Chriſtians,* I note as a *manifeſt Abſurdity.* And you grant that there is *great Abſurdity ſomewhere in the caſe.* And I aſſure you I am very well content that the Imputation ſhould lie where it ought to lie: And I know of no occaſion I have given you to think otherwiſe. L. p. 3. P. 10.

But here, having mention'd an *Example* of this *extreme Abſurdity* (as you juſtly call it) which *we have in a neighbouring Country, where the Prince declares he will have all his Diſſenting Subjects ſaved, and purſuant thereunto has taken away the lives of many of them:* You are pleas'd to add the following words: *For thither at laſt Perſecution* (ſo, it ſeems, you call all uſe of Puniſhments for Religion) *muſt come: As, I fear, notwithſtanding your talk of moderate Puniſhments, you your ſelf intimate in theſe words;* 'Not that 'I think the Sword is to be uſed in this buſineſs, (as I have ſufficiently declared already;) but becauſe all Coactive Power reſolves 'at laſt into the Sword; ſince all (I do not ſay, that will not be '*reform'd in this matter* by leſſer Penalties, but) that refuſe to *ſub*'*mit* to leſſer Penalties, muſt at laſt fall under the ſtroke of it. *In which words if you mean any thing to the buſineſs in hand, you ſeem to have a reſerve for greater Puniſhments, when leſſer are not ſufficient to bring men to be convinced.* And will you ever pretend to either Conſcience, or Modeſty, after this? For, I beſeech you, Sir, What words could I have uſed more expreſs or effectual, to ſignify, that in my opinion, no Diſſenters from the true Religion ought to be puniſh'd with the *Sword,* but ſuch as chooſe rather to rebel againſt the Magiſtrate, than to ſubmit to leſſer Penalties? (For how any ſhould *refuſe to ſubmit to thoſe Penalties,* but by rebelling againſt the Magiſtrate, I ſuppoſe you will not undertake to tell me.) 'Twas for this very purpoſe that I uſed thoſe words, to prevent Cavils (as I was then ſo ſimple as to think I might:) And I dare appeal to any man of Common Senſe and Common Honeſty, whether they are capable of any other meaning. And yet the very thing which I ſo plainly diſclaim in them, you pretend (without ſo much as offering to ſhew how) to collect from them. *Thither,* you ſay, *at laſt* (*viz.* to the *taking away men's lives for* P. 10,11. A. p. 23.

the

the saving their Souls) *Persecution must come: As* you *fear, notwithstanding* my talk of *moderate Punishments*, I my self *intimate in those words: And if* I mean *any thing in them to the business in hand*, I seem to *have a reserve for greater Punishments; when lesser are not sufficient to bring men to be convinced.* Sir, I should expect fairer dealing from one of your *Pagans* or *Mahumetans*. But I shall only add, that I would never wish that any man who has undertaken a bad Cause, should more plainly confess it, than by serving it as here (and not here onely) you serve yours.

A. p. 5. Where I say, 'If Force be used, not instead of Reason and Arguments, that is, not to convince by its own proper Efficacy
P. 11. '(which it cannot do) *&c.* you say you *think those who make Laws and use Force, to bring men to Church-Conformity in Religion, seek onely the Compliance, but concern themselves not for the Conviction of those they punish; and so never use Force to convince. For*, you add, *pray tell me; When any Dissenter conforms, and enters into the Church-Communion, is he ever examin'd to see whether he does it upon Reason, and Conviction, and such Grounds as would become a Christian concern'd for Religion? If Persecution* (*as is pretended*) *were for the Salvation of men's Souls, this would be done; and men not driven to take the Sacrament to keep their Places, or to obtain Licences to sell Ale*, (*for so low have these holy Things been prostituted,*) *&c.* Who they be that *pretend* that *Persecution is for the Salvation of men's Souls*, I know not. But as to those Magistrates, who having provided sufficiently for the Instruction of all under their care, in the true Religion, do *make Laws*, and use moderate Penalties to bring men to the Communion of the Church of God, and to *Conformity* to the Rules and Orders of it; I think their Behaviour does plainly enough speak them to *seek* and *concern themselves* for the *Conviction of those whom they punish*, and for their *Compliance*, onely as the fruit of their *Conviction*. Nor does the contrary appear from the *not examining Dissenters when they conform, to see whether they do it upon Reason and Conviction*, &c. For where the course I speak of is held, it is ordinarily presumeable, that when Dissenters *conform*, they do it *upon Reason, and Conviction*. And as to irreligious Persons, who onely seek their secular Advantage; how easy is it for them to pretend *Conviction*, and to offer *such Grounds* (if that were required) as *would become a Christian concern'd for Religion?* This is what no care of man can certainly prevent. And therefore if such Persons profane the *Sacrament, to keep their Places*, or *to obtain Licences to sell Ale*; this

this is an horrible Wickedneſs indeed; but it is their own, and they alone muſt anſwer for it. But it is very unjuſt to impute it to thoſe who *make ſuch Laws*, and *uſe ſuch Force*; or to ſay that they *proſtitute holy Things*, and *drive men* to profane them. They deſign by their Laws, to contribute what lies in them, to make men good Chriſtians: But if after all that they can do, wicked and Godleſs men will ſtill reſolve to be ſo; they will be ſo, and I know not who, but God Almighty, can help it.

That ſome men would *through careleſsneſs never acquaint themſelves with the Truth which muſt ſave them, without being forced to do it*, (which I ſuppoſe,) may be very true, notwithſtanding that (as you ſay) *ſome are call'd at the third, ſome at the nineth, and ſome at the eleventh hour; and whenever they are call'd, they embrace all the Truth neceſſary to Salvation.* At leaſt you do not ſhew why it may not: And therefore this may be no *ſlip*, for any thing you have ſaid to prove it to be one. P. 12.

Where the *groſs and palpable Miſtakes* lie, appears, I ſuppoſe, in part already. But you inſtance in my ſaying that *Force uſed to bring men to conſider, does indirectly, and at a diſtance, ſome ſervice. For here*, you tell me, I *walk in the dark, and endeavour to cover* my ſelf *with Obſcurity, by omitting two neceſſary parts. As, firſt, who muſt uſe this Force.* And yet your very next words are, *Which though you tell us not here* (where it would have been impertinent to *tell* you; becauſe, as any man may ſee, I was there onely to conſider, whether Force was *uſeful*, or not; not *who* was to uſe it:) *yet by other parts of your Treatiſe 'tis plain you mean the Magiſtrate. Secondly*, you tell me, I *omit to ſay upon whom it muſt be uſed:* Whereas 'tis plain enough too, as I ſuppoſe, *by other parts of* my *Treatiſe*, that the Force I ſpeak of, is, according to my opinion, to be uſed upon ſuch, and ſuch onely, as having ſufficient means of Inſtruction in the true Religion provided for them, do yet refuſe to embrace it. But this you would not ſee; becauſe, it ſeems, you thought it more for your purpoſe to tell me, that *thoſe upon whom*, in my opinion, *Force is to be uſed*, if I *ſay any thing to* my *purpoſe*, *muſt be Diſſenters from the National Religion, thoſe who come not into Church-Communion with the Magiſtrate. And then*, you ſay, my *Propoſition in fair plain terms will ſtand thus*: 'If the Magi-'ſtrate puniſh Diſſenters, onely to bring them to conſider thoſe 'Reaſons and Arguments which are proper to convince them; who 'can deny but that, indirectly, and at a diſtance, it may do ſervice, '&c. towards the bringing men to embrace that Truth which 'other- P. 12. A. p. 5.

'otherwiſe they would never be acquainted with? &c. *In which Propoſition*, you ſay, 1. *There is ſomething impracticable.* 2. *Something unjuſt.* *And* 3. *Whatever Efficacy there is in Force* (my *way applied*) *to bring men to conſider and be convinced, it makes againſt me.*

1. You ſay, *It is impracticable to puniſh Diſſenters, as Diſſenters, onely to make them conſider.* And why ſo? The Reaſon follows: *For if you puniſh them as Diſſenters, you puniſh them for not being of the National Religion. And to puniſh a man for not being of the National Religion, is not to puniſh him onely to make him conſider; unleſs not to be of the National Religion, and not to conſider, be the ſame thing.* But cannot Diſſenters be puniſh'd for *not being of the National Religion*, as the *Fault*, and yet *onely to make them conſider*, as the *End* for which they are puniſh'd? Cannot this be the *onely End*, unleſs it be the onely *Cauſe* alſo of their Puniſhment? But after all, whoever will but conſider my words, will eaſily ſee that there was no manner of occaſion for this Subtlety. For my words are, 'If Force be uſed not inſtead of Reaſon and Argu-'ments, *i.e.* not to convince by its own proper Efficacy (which 'it cannot do) but onely to bring men to conſider thoſe Reaſons 'and Arguments which are proper and ſufficient to convince them, *&c.* Where 'tis plain that by *onely*, I exclude no other End of the uſe of Force, but onely that of *convincing men's Minds by its own proper Efficacy.*

P. 12. If you ſuppoſe (as you ſeem here to do) that I am for *puniſhing Diſſenters, whether they conſider or no;* you are in a great miſtake. For the *Diſſenters* (which is your word, and not mine) whom I am for *puniſhing*, are onely ſuch as *reject* the *true Religion*, propoſed to them with Reaſons and Arguments ſufficient to convince them of the truth of it: Who therefore can never be ſuppoſed to conſider thoſe Reaſons and Arguments as they ought, whileſt they perſiſt in rejecting that Religion, or (in your language) whileſt they continue *Diſſenters:* For if they did ſo conſider them, they would not continue *Diſſenters.*

P. 13. 2. You ſay, *To puniſh men out of the Communion of the National Church, to make them conſider, is unjuſt. They are puniſh'd, becauſe out of the National Church: And they are out of the National Church, becauſe they are not yet convinced. Their ſtanding out therefore in this ſtate, whileſt they are not convinced, not ſatisfied in their Minds, is no Fault; and therefore cannot juſtly be puniſh'd.* To which I anſwer: Where the *National Church* is the true Church of God, to which all men ought to join themſelves; and ſufficient Evi-

dence

dence is offer'd, to convince men that it is ſo: there it is a *Fault* to be *out of the National Church*, becauſe it is a Fault not to be *convinced* that the National Church is that true Church of God. And therefore ſince there men's not being ſo *convinced*, can onely be imputed to their not *conſidering* as they ought, the Evidence which is offer'd to convince them; it cannot be *unjuſt* to *puniſh* them to *make them* ſo to *conſider it*.

What *Juſtice it would be* for the Magiſtrate to puniſh me for not being a *Carteſian*, it will be time enough to conſider, when you have proved it to be as neceſſary for men to be *Carteſians*, as it is to be *Chriſtians*, or members of God's *Church*. P. 13.

3. You ſay, *Whatever indirect Efficacy there be in Force, applied your way, it makes againſt you. Force uſed by the Magiſtrate to bring men to conſider thoſe Reaſons and Arguments, which are proper and ſufficient to convince them, but which without being forced, they would not conſider; may, ſay you, be ſerviceable indirectly, and at a diſtance, to make men embrace the Truth which muſt ſave them. And thus, ſay I, it may be ſerviceable to bring men to receive and embrace Falſhood, which will deſtroy them.* How, Sir? May Force uſed by the Magiſtrate to bring men to conſider thoſe Reaſons and Arguments which are *proper and ſufficient to convince them*, be *ſerviceable to bring men to embrace Falſhood?* ſuch *Falſhood* as *will deſtroy them?* It ſeems then, there are *Reaſons* and *Arguments*, which are *proper and ſufficient to convince men* of the truth of *Falſhood which will deſtroy them*. Which is certainly a very extraordinary Diſcovery; though ſuch as no man can have any reaſon to thank you for. That God, in his juſt Judgement, will ſend ſuch as *receive not the love of the Truth, that they may be ſaved*, but reject it for the *pleaſure they have in unrighteouſneſs*, ἐνέργειαν πλάνης, *ſtrong deluſion*, i. e. ſuch *Reaſons and Arguments* as will prevail with men ſo diſpoſed, *to believe a Lie, that they may be damn'd;* This, I confeſs, the Scripture plainly teaches us. But that there are any ſuch *Reaſons* or *Arguments*, as are *proper and ſufficient to convince* or ſatisfy any, but ſuch reſolute and obdurate Sinners, of the truth of ſuch *Falſhood* as *will deſtroy them*, is a Poſition which I am ſure the Scripture does not teach us, and which, when you have better conſider'd it, I hope you will not undertake to maintain. And yet if it be not maintainable, what you ſay here is to no purpoſe: For if there be no ſuch *Reaſons* and *Arguments* as here we ſpeak of, 'tis in vain to talk of the Magiſtrate's *uſing Force to make men conſider them*. P. 13. 2 Theſ. 2. 10, 11, 12.

But however, let it be supposed, if you please, that there are such *Reasons* and *Arguments* as are *proper and sufficient to convince men of the truth of Falshood which will destroy them;* And, that Force applied by the Magistrate to make men consider them, might be *serviceable to bring men to receive and embrace such Falshood:* What will you conclude from thence? May it not be true nevertheless, that Force used by the Magistrate to bring men to consider those Reasons and Arguments which are proper and sufficient to convince them, but which without being forced they would not consider, may be serviceable *indirectly*, and *at a distance*, to bring men to embrace *the Truth which must save them?* Which is all that I am here concern'd to make good.

But not content to say, that *Force* my *way applied* (*i. e.* to bring men to embrace the Truth which must save them) *may be serviceable to bring men to embrace Falshood which will destroy them;* and so is *proper to do as much harm as good;* (which seems strange enough;) you add (to encrease the wonder) that in my *indirect* P. 14. *way, it is much more proper, and likely, to make men receive and embrace Error, than the Truth:* And that,

1. *Because Men out of the right Way are as apt, and* you *think* you *may say apter, to use Force, than others.* Which is, doubtless, an irrefragable Demonstration, that Force used by the Magistrate to bring men to receive and embrace the Truth which must save them, is *much more proper and likely to make men receive Error, than the Truth.* But, Sir, I beseech you, how come we to talk here of what *men out of the right Way*, are *apt* to do, to bring others into their, *i. e.* a *wrong Way;* where we are onely enquiring, What may be done to bring men to the *right Way?* For that, I must put you in mind, is our Question, *viz.* Whether the Magistrate has any Right to use Force, to bring men to the *true Religion?* Now L. p. 8. whereas our Author says that Penalties, or Force is *absolutely impertinent in this case, because it is not proper to convince the Mind;* A. p. 5. To which I answer, that though Force be not proper to *convince the Mind*, yet it is not *absolutely impertinent in this case*, because it may, however, do some service towards the bringing men to embrace the Truth which must save them, by bringing them to *consider those Reasons and Arguments which are proper to convince the Mind, and which without being forced, they would not consider:* Here you tell me, No, but it is *much more proper, and likely, to make men receive and embrace Error than Truth;* because *men out of the right Way are as apt, and perhaps apter, to use Force, than others.*

others. Which is as good a proof, I believe, as the thing would admit: For otherwiſe, I ſuppoſe, you would have given us a better.

As to what you ſay here, on the by, of the *Mildneſs and Gentleneſs of the Goſpel, which is apter to uſe Prayers and Intreaties, then Force, to gain a hearing:* I ſhall onely demand of you, Whether the *Mildneſs and Gentleneſs of the Goſpel* deſtroys the Coactive Power of the Magiſtrate, or not? If you ſay it does not; (and I ſuppoſe you will not ſay it does;) then it ſeems the Magiſtrate may uſe his Coactive Power, without offending againſt the *Mildneſs and Gentleneſs of the Goſpel.* And ſo, though they that have not that Power, can onely uſe *Prayers and Intreaties to gain a hearing:* yet it will conſiſt well enough with the *Mildneſs and Gentleneſs of the Goſpel,* for the Magiſtrate to uſe his Coactive Power to procure them a *hearing,* where their *Prayers and Intreaties* will not do it. P. 14.

But you ſay *Force* in my *indirect Way, is much more proper, and likely, to make men receive and embrace Error than Truth,*

2. *Becauſe the Magiſtrates of the World being few of them in the right Way; (not one of ten,* let me *take which ſide* I *will*) *perhaps not one of an hundred being of the true Religion; 'tis likely* my *indirect way of uſing Force would do an hundred, or at leaſt ten times as much harm as good: &c.* Which would have been to the purpoſe, if I had aſſerted that every Magiſtrate may uſe Force, my *indirect way* (or any way) to bring men to his *own* Religion, whatever that be. But if I aſſert no ſuch thing; (as no man, I think, but an Atheiſt, will aſſert it:) then this is quite beſide the buſineſs.

But to ſhew me that, *under another pretenſe,* I *put into the Magiſtrate's hands as much Power to force men to his Religion, as any the openeſt Perſecutors can pretend to,* you ask, *What difference is there between puniſhing men to bring them to Maſs; and puniſhing them to bring them to conſider thoſe Reaſons and Arguments, which are proper and ſufficient to convince them that they ought to go to Maſs?* A Queſtion which I ſhall then think my ſelf obliged to anſwer, when you have produced thoſe *Reaſons and Arguments which are proper and ſufficient to convince men that they ought to go to Maſs.* P. 14,15.

If you reply, ſay you, (to this pleaſant Queſtion,) *you meant Reaſons and Arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them of the Truth: I anſwer, if you meant ſo, why did not you ſay ſo?* As if it were poſſible for any man that reads my *Anſwer,* to think I meant otherwiſe. *But,* ſay you, *if you had ſaid ſo, it would in this caſe do you little ſervice. For the Maſs, in* France, *is as much ſuppoſed*

the Truth, as the Liturgy here. So that it ſeems, in your opinion, whatſoever is *ſuppoſed* the Truth, *is* the Truth: (For otherwiſe this Reaſon of yours is none at all.) Which evidently makes all Religions alike, to thoſe who *ſuppoſe* them *true.* Which is the thing you muſt own, if you will maintain that my *way of applying Force will as much promote Popery in* France, *as Proteſtantiſm in* England.

P. 15. Whether *this Uſefulneſs of Force amounts to no more but this, That it is not impoſſible but that it may be uſeful,* I leave to be judged by what has been ſaid.

P. 15. But you proceed, and ſay, *Force your way applied, as it may be uſeful, ſo alſo it may be uſeleſs. For,* 1. *Where the Law puniſhes Diſſenters, without telling them it is to make them conſider, they may through ignorance and overſight neglect to do it, and ſo your Force proves uſeleſs.* But where the Law provides ſufficient means of Inſtruction for all, as well as *Puniſhment* for *Diſſenters,* it is ſo plain to all concern'd, that the Puniſhment is intended to *make them conſider,* that I ſee no danger of men's *neglecting to do it, through ignorance or overſight.* 2. You ſay, *Some Diſſenters may have conſider'd already, and then Force employ'd upon them muſt needs be uſeleſs; unleſs you can think it uſeful to puniſh a man to make him do that which he hath done already.* And I ſay, No man who rejects Truth neceſſary to his Salvation, has *conſider'd already,* as he ought to conſider: Which is enough to ſhew the vanity of this Argument. 3. You ſay, *God has not directed it: and therefore we have no reaſon to expect he ſhould make it ſucceſsful.* The contrary of which ſhall be ſhewn in a more proper place.

P. 15, 16. You add further, that *Force may be hurtful: nay,* you ſay, *it is likely to prove more hurtful than uſeful.* 1. *Becauſe to puniſh men for that, which 'tis viſible cannot be known whether they have perform'd or no, is ſo palpable an injuſtice, &c.* (Which has already been ſpoken to.) 2. *Becauſe the greateſt part of Mankind being not able to diſcern betwixt Truth and Falſhood, that depend upon long and many Proofs, and remote Conſequences; nor having ability enough to diſcover the falſe Grounds, and reſiſt the captious and fallacious Arguments of Learned Men vers'd in Controverſies; are ſo much more expoſed, by the Force which is uſed to make them hearken to the Information and Inſtruction of men appointed to it by the Magiſtrate, or thoſe of his Religion, to be led into Falſhood and Error than they are likely this way to be brought to embrace the Truth which muſt ſave them; by how much the National Religions of the World are, beyond com-*

comparison, more of them False or Erroneous, than such as have God for their Author, and Truth for their Standard.

If the first part of this be true; then an *Infallible Guide*, and *Implicit Faith* are more necessary than ever I thought them. For if the *greatest part of Mankind be not able to discern betwixt Truth and Falshood*, in matters concerning their Salvation, (as you must mean, if you speak to the purpose;) their condition must needs be very hazardous, if they have not some *Guide* or *Judge*, to whose determination and direction they may securely resign themselves. But for my part, as I know of no such *Guide* of God's appointing, so I think there is no need of any such; because notwithstanding *the long and many Proofs, and remote Consequences, the false Grounds, and the captious and fallacious Arguments of Learned Men vers'd in Controversies*, with which you (as well as those of the *Roman* Communion) endeavour to amuse us, through the Goodness of God, the Truth which is necessary to Salvation, lies so obvious and exposed to all that sincerely and diligently seek it, that no such person shall ever fail of attaining the knowledge of it. Nor is the famous instance you give us, of the two *Rainoldses*, of any moment to prove the contrary; unless you can undertake that he that err'd, was as *sincere* in his enquiry after that Truth, as you suppose him *able to examine and judge.*

But (whatever you think of this matter) 'tis plain the *Force* you here speak of, is not Force *my way applied; i. e.* applied to the promoting the *true Religion* onely, but to the promoting of all the National Religions in the World. And therefore I can easily grant you all that you would have, without any the least prejudice to my Cause. For how much soever *the National Religions are more of them False or Erroneous, than such as have God for their Author, and Truth for their Standard;* and how much soever *the greatest part of Mankind may be exposed, by the Force which is used to make them hearken to the Information and Instruction of Men appointed to it by the Magistrate, or those of his Religion, to be led into Falshood and Error, than they are likely this way to be brought to embrace the Truth which must save them:* Yet every one sees that it may be true nevertheless, that convenient Force used to bring men to the *true Religion*, (which is all that I contend for, and all that I allow,) may be very serviceable for that purpose, by bringing men to that *Consideration*, which nothing else (besides the extraordinary Grace of God) would bring them to: Which is that which I mean by *doing service indirectly, and at a distance*, toward the

the bringing men to the true Religion, and ſo to Salvation.

You might therefore, for any thing I ſee, have ſpared the *Pains*
P. 16. you have *here taken, to give* me *a view of the Uſefulneſs of Force*
P. 17. my *way applied.* For how confidently ſoever you tell me that it *amounts but to the ſhadow and Poſſibility of Uſefulneſs, but with an overbalancing weight of Miſchief and Harm annex'd to it;* I hope I have ſufficiently made it appear, that inſtead of proving this, you have onely trifled hitherto, and ſaid nothing at all againſt my Aſſertion.

Having thus, as you imagine, or (to ſpeak more properly perhaps) as you would have it thought, deſtroy'd the *Uſefulneſs of Force* which I had aſſerted, you go on to new matter of triumph.
P. 17. *But ſuppoſe,* ſay you, *Force applied your way, were as uſeful for the promoting true Religion, as I ſuppoſe I have ſhew'd it to be the contrary; it does not from thence follow that it is lawful and may be uſed.* By your favour, Sir, I think it does follow from thence, that Force is not *therefore unlawful to be uſed,* becauſe it is *utterly uſeleſs,* or *abſolutely impertinent:* which is all that I was to ſhew againſt our Author: That being all in effect, that he ſays, to prove the unlawfulneſs of uſing Force in matters of Religion; as has already been made appear, againſt all that you ſay to the contrary.

But as to the *Lawfulneſs* of ſuch Force as I take to be uſeful for the promoting the true Religion; I muſt again put you in mind, that I do not ground it upon the bare *Uſefulneſs* of ſuch Force, but upon the *Neceſſity,* as well as Uſefulneſs of it: as any man muſt acknowledge that reads my *Anſwer:* Where as I ſhew at large, that Force is generally *neceſſary* to bring thoſe that wan-
A. p. 6. der, to the right Way; ſo I expreſly declare that I look upon outward Force to be no fit means to be uſed either for that purpoſe, or for any other, where it is not *neceſſary,* as well as *uſeful.*
P. 17. And therefore how *uſeful* ſoever you may ſuppoſe it *in a Pariſh that has no Teacher, or as bad as none, that a Layman that wanted not abilities for it, ſhould ſometimes preach to them the Doctrine of the Goſpel, &c.* yet unleſs you ſuppoſe it *neceſſary* withall, it will not ſerve your purpoſe. And that you cannot ſuppoſe it *neceſſary,* is evident; becauſe any ſuch Pariſh may quickly have redreſs, if they will but ſeek it.

(Whether I have rightly *framed the Author's Argument,* or not, has already been conſider'd.)
P. 18. You ſay further, *As Force applied your way is apt to make the Inconſiderate conſider, ſo Force applied another way, is as apt to make the*

the Laſcivious chaſte, &c. Thus you ſee Caſtration may indirectly, and at a diſtance, be ſerviceable towards the Salvation of men's Souls. But will you ſay, from ſuch an uſefulneſs as this, that therefore the Magiſtrate has a right to do it, and may by Force make his Subjects Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven? Where again I muſt tell you, that unleſs you will ſay *Caſtration* is *neceſſary*, as well as *apt*, to *make the laſcivious chaſte*; this will afford you no advantage. Now I ſuppoſe you will not ſay Caſtration is *neceſſary*, becauſe I hope you acknowledge that Marriage, and that Grace which God denies to none who ſeriouſly ask it, are ſufficient for that purpoſe.

But, however, this is not a like Caſe. For if Caſtration makes any laſcivious perſon *chaſte*; it does it by taking away the Part upon which the Power of offending depends: Whereas the Force which I think may be uſed in order to the curing men of deſtructive Errors concerning the Way of Salvation, does not deſtroy the Poſſibility of *erring*, by taking away, or any way diſabling the offending Part, but leaves men's Brains ſafe in their Skulls. Indeed if I had ſaid, that to cure men of damnable or dangerous Errors, it is uſeful to *knock out their Brains*; the Caſe had been exactly parallel (as far as *Uſefulneſs* goes.) But ſince I ſay no ſuch thing, I hope no man that has any Brains, will ſay it is.

You add, *It is not for the Magiſtrate, or any body elſe, upon an imagination of its Uſefulneſs, to make uſe of any other means, for the Salvation of men's Souls, than what the Author and Finiſher of our Faith has directed.* Which, how true ſoever, is not, I think, very much to the purpoſe. For if the Magiſtrate does only aſſiſt that Miniſtery which our Lord has appointed, by uſing ſo much of his Coactive Power for the furthering their Service, as common Experience diſcovers to be uſeful and neceſſary for that End; there is no manner of ground to ſay, that *upon an imagination of its Uſefulneſs*, he makes uſe of *any other means for the Salvation of Men's Souls, than what the Author and Finiſher of our Faith has directed.* P. 18.

'Tis true indeed, *the Author and Finiſher of our Faith* has given the Magiſtrate no new Power, or Commiſſion: nor was there any need that he ſhould, (if himſelf had had any Temporal Power to give:) For he found him already, even by the *Law of Nature*, the *Miniſter of God to the People for good*, and *bearing the Sword not in vain*, *i. e.* inveſted with Coactive Power, and obliged to uſe it for all the good purpoſes which it might ſerve, and for which it ſhould be found needful; even for the reſtraining of falſe and corrupt Religion; as *Job* long before (perhaps before any part of the Scri-

Scriptures were written) acknowledged, when he ſaid that the worſhiping the *Sun* or the *Moon*, was *an iniquity to be puniſh'd by the Judge*. But though our Saviour has given the Magiſtrates no new Power; yet being *King of Kings*, he expects and requires, that they ſhould ſubmit themſelves to his Sceptre, and uſe the Power which always belong'd to them, for his ſervice, and for the advancing his Spiritual Kingdom in the World. And even that *Charity* which our great Maſter ſo earneſtly recommends, and ſo ſtrictly requires of all his Diſciples, as it obliges all men to ſeek and promote the good of others, as well as their own, eſpecially their ſpiritual and eternal good, by ſuch means as their ſeveral Places and Relations enable them to uſe; ſo does it eſpecially oblige the Magiſtrate to do it *as a Magiſtrate*, *i. e.* by that Power which enables him to do it above the rate of other men.

Job 31. 26, 27, 28.

So far therefore is the Chriſtian Magiſtrate, when he gives his helping hand to the furtherance of the Goſpel, by laying convenient Penalties upon ſuch as reject it, or any part of it, from *uſing any other means* for the Salvation of men's Souls, *than what the Author and Finiſher of our Faith has directed*, that he does no more than his Duty to God, to his Redeemer, and to his Subjects, requires of him.

P. 18. You add, *You may be miſtaken in what you think uſeful.* No doubt of that, Sir: But you have not ſhewn that I am miſtaken. Dives *thought*, ſay you, *and ſo perhaps ſhould you and I too, if not better inform'd by the Scriptures, that it would be uſeful to rouze and awaken men, if one ſhould come to them from the dead. But he was miſtaken. And we are told, that if men will not hearken to* Moſes *and the Prophets, the means appointed, neither will the Strangeneſs nor Terror of one coming from the dead perſwade them.* Very good, Sir: And what then? *Dives* thought, it ſeems, that though *Moſes and the Prophets* had not prevail'd with his Brethren to repent; yet if *Lazarus* were ſent to them *from the dead*, to teſtify what he had ſeen and heard in the other World; ſuch an Evidence as this, ſo much greater than *Moſes and the Prophets* had given, of the Neceſſity of Repentance, would not fail of taking effect upon them. But herein *Abraham* aſſures him he was miſtaken; and that the true ground of his Brethren's not being perſwaded by *Moſes and the Prophets*, was not any want of *Evidence* in them (as he thought it was,) but onely their own Hardneſs and Inſenſibility, contracted by the cuſtom of ſinning, which render'd them incapable of any impreſſions from the greateſt Evidence that could be given.

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This I take to be the meaning of those words, *If they hear not* Moses *and the* Prophets, (*i. e.* if they hear them not *effectually*, so as to be *perswaded* by them; as appears by the next Clause, where the same thing is expres'd by that word;) *neither will they be perswaded, though one rose from the dead.* But how does this concern the matter before us? Is there any thing in my Assertion like this Mistake of *Dives?* Do I any where say that the *means appointed* for the satisfying men's Minds concerning the true Religion, are not sufficient to do it, without the Assistance of outward Force? Or, that the Magistrate is more likely to convince men's Understanding, by inflicting Penalties, than Christ's Ministers are, by preaching the Gospel? If I had said any such thing, you might reasonably enough have put me in mind how *Dives* was *mistaken* in what he *thought useful.* But if I do expressly deny that Force has any *proper Efficacy* to convince men's Minds, and do place all its *Usefulness* in its Subserviency to the *means appointed* for that purpose, as it is apt to take off that unreasonable Averseness and Prejudice, which usually keeps those who reject the Truth, from applying themselves to those *means:* then though *Dives* was *mistaken* in thinking that *Lazarus* might be able to convert his Brethren, though *Moses and the Prophets* had not done it; it may, however, be no *Mistake*, to think Force *useful* for the purpose for which I affirm it to be so.

You go on: *If what we are apt to think useful were thence to be concluded so, we should (I fear) be obliged to believe the Miracles pretended to by the Church of Rome.* Never *fear* it, Sir; for I assure you there is no danger of it. But it seems you think there is. *For,* say you, *Miracles, we know, were once useful for the promoting true Religion, and the Salvation of Souls; which is more than you can say for your Political Punishments. But yet we must conclude that God thinks them not useful now, unless we will say (that which without Impiety cannot be said) that the Wise and Benign Disposer and Governer of all things does not now use all useful means for promoting his own Honour in the World, and the good of Souls.* And then you add, *I think this Consequence will hold, as well as what you draw in near the same words.* But I think it is easy to shew it will not. For in the place you intend, I speak not of *useful*, but of *competent*, i. e. *sufficient means.* Now *competent*, or *sufficient* means are *necessary:* but I think no man will say that all *useful* means are so. And therefore though, as I affirm, it cannot be said without Impiety, that *the Wise and Benign Disposer and Governer of all things* P. 19. A P. 16.

 has

has not furniſh'd Mankind with competent means for the promoting his own Honour in the World, and the good of Souls; yet it is very agreeable with *Piety*, and with Truth too, to ſay that he does not now uſe all *uſeful* means: Becauſe as none of his Attributes obliges him to uſe more than *ſufficient* means; ſo he may uſe *ſufficient* means, without uſing all *uſeful* means. For where there are many uſeful means, and ſome of them are ſufficient without the reſt, there is no neceſſity of uſing them all. So that from God's not uſing Miracles *now*, to promote the true Religion, you cannot conclude that he does not *think them uſeful now*, but onely that he does not think them *neceſſary*. And therefore though *what we are apt to think uſeful, were thence to be concluded ſo;* yet if whatever is *uſeful*, be not likewiſe to be concluded *neceſſary;* there is no reaſon to *fear* that *we ſhould be obliged to believe the Miracles pretended to by the Church of* Rome. For if Miracles be not now *neceſſary*, there is no inconvenience in thinking the *Miracles pretended to by the Church of* Rome, to be but *pretended* Miracles.

But after all, how comes this Suppoſition in, *That what we are apt to think uſeful, is thence to be concluded ſo?* For, whatever you would inſinuate, I ſpeak not of *what we are apt to think* or phanſy, with little or no reaſon, to be *uſeful:* but of what we judge ſo upon juſt and ſufficient grounds: Upon a *ſtrong Probability of Suc-*
P. 17. *ceſs* (which you your ſelf ſeem to think ſufficient, not onely to ground an opinion of its Uſefulneſs, but even to warrant the Uſe of it,) grounded upon the conſideration of Humane Nature, and the general temper of Mankind, apt to be wrought upon by the Method I ſpeak of: And upon the indiſputable atteſtation of Experience. For how confidently ſoever you tell me here, that it is more than I can ſay for my *Political Puniſhments*, that they *were ever uſeful for the promoting true Religion;* I appeal to all obſerving perſons, Whether where-ever true Religion, or ſound Chriſtianity has been Nationally received, and eſtabliſh'd by moderate Penal Laws, it has not always viſibly loſt ground by the relaxation of thoſe Laws: Whether Sects and Hereſies (even the wildeſt and moſt abſurd,) and even *Epicuriſm* and *Atheiſm* have not continually thereupon ſpread themſelves: and Whether the very Spirit and Life of Chriſtianity has not ſenſibly decayed, as well as the number of ſound Profeſſors of it been dayly leſſen'd upon it. (Not to ſpeak of what at this time our eyes cannot but ſee, for fear of giving offenſe: Though I hope it will be none to any that have a juſt concern for Truth and Piety, to take notice of the

the Books and Pamphlets which now fly ſo thick about this Kingdom, manifeſtly tending to the multiplying of Sects and Diviſions, and even to the promoting of *Scepticiſm* in Religion among us. In which number I ſhall not much need your pardon, if I reckon the *Firſt*, and *Second Letter concerning Toleration.*) And if theſe have always been the Fruits of the relaxation of moderate Penal Laws, made for the preſerving and advancing true Religion; I think this conſideration alone is abundantly ſufficient to ſhew the Uſefulneſs and Benefit of ſuch Laws. For if theſe Evils have conſtantly ſprung from the relaxation of thoſe Laws, 'tis evident they were prevented before by thoſe Laws.

Though the *Work of our Salvation* be, as you juſtly call it, *ſtupendous and ſupernatural;* yet I ſuppoſe no ſober man doubts but it both admits, and ordinarily requires the uſe of *natural* and *humane* means, in ſubordination to that *Grace* which works it. And therefore till you have ſhewn (as you have not yet) that no Penal Laws that can be made, can do any ſervice toward the ſalvation of men's Souls, in ſubordination to God's Grace; or that God has forbidden the Magiſtrate to ſerve him in that great *Work*, with the Authority which he has given him; there will be no occaſion for the Caution you give us, *not to be wiſer than our Maker in that ſtupendous and ſupernatural Work.* P. 19.

You add, *When you can ſhew any Commiſſion in Scripture, for the uſe of Force, to compell men to hear, any more than to embrace the Doctrine of others that differ from them, we ſhall have reaſon to ſubmit to it, and the Magiſtrate have ſome ground to ſet up this new way of Perſecution.* To which I anſwer: Though no Force can compell men to *embrace* (if by that you mean, to *believe*) *the Doctrine of others that differ from them;* yet ſome Force may induce thoſe who would not otherwiſe, to *hear* what may and ought to move them to *embrace* the Truth. And if the Magiſtrate has Commiſſion to uſe convenient Force, or Penalties, for that purpoſe; his doing it will not be the *ſetting up a new way of Perſecution*, but the diſcharging an *old Duty*. I call it ſo, becauſe it is as old as the Law of Nature, in which the Magiſtrate's Commiſſion lies, as has been ſhewn already. For the Scripture does not properly give it him, but preſuppoſes it (and ſpeaks of him as *antecedently* entruſted with it,) as it does alſo the Law of Nature, which is God's Law as well as the Scripture.

But till then, you ſay, (*i. e.* till I *can ſhew a Commiſſion in Scripture, &c.*) *'twill be fit for us to obey that Precept of the Goſpel,*

which bids us take heed what we hear. So that hearing is not always so useful as you suppose. If it had, we should never have had so direct a Caution against it. This, I suppose, is onely intended for the vulgar Reader. For all the Force of it lies in our *English* Version of the Text you mention: Which may, and ought (the Context requiring it) to be render'd, *Attend*, or *give heed to what you hear*. And if this be the true sense of the Place, (as any one that considers it well, will find it to be;) then our Saviour's *Precept* is so far from being a *direct Caution against hearing*, that on the contrary, it requires *hearing* with great *Attention* and *Consideration*.

Vid. Grot. *ad* Marci *cap.* 4. *com.* 24.

P. 19. *Go and teach all Nations*, you say, *was a Commission of our Saviour's: But there was not added to it, Punish those that will not hear and consider what you say. No, but if they will not receive you, shake off the dust of your feet; leave them, and apply your selves to some others.* Which is all very true indeed, but nothing at all to your purpose. For as our Saviour was no *Magistrate*, and therefore could not inflict *Political Punishments* upon any man; so much less could he empower his *Apostles* to do it. But as he *could* not punish men to *make them hear* him; so neither was there any need that he should. He came as a Prophet sent from God, to reveal a new Doctrine to the World. And therefore to prove his Mission, he was to do such things as could onely be done by a divine Power. And the Works which he did, were abundantly sufficient both to gain him a *hearing*, and to oblige the World to receive his Doctrine. And accordingly, when he sent his Apostles to preach his Gospel, though as he could not, so he did not *add, Punish those that will not hear and consider what you say;* yet he communicated to them the Power of Miracles, and bad them *heal the sick, cleanse the Lepers, raise the dead, and cast out Devils:* Which might serve altogether as well to procure them a *hearing*, and a great deal better, to manifest the divine Authority of their Doctrine, so as to leave them that should not embrace it, more inexcusable than *Sodom* and *Gomorrha*. And what extraordinary Gifts and Powers our Lord bestow'd after his Ascension, for the propagation of his Gospel, which were continued in his Church, in such measures as he thought fit, for some Ages after, I need not mention. But what can be concluded from hence? That when Christian Religion was sufficiently rooted and establish'd in the World, and those extraordinary Graces were withdrawn, as no longer necessary, Penal Laws could do no service toward the preserving and promoting it? or, That the Christian Magistrate had no Authority to make

Luke 12. 14.

Mat. 10. 8.

Vers. 15.

Vid. Hen. Dodwelli *Dissertat. in* Irenæum, *Diss.* 2.

any

any such Laws for the preserving and promoting it? No such matter. On the contrary, considering that those extraordinary Means were not withdrawn, till by their help Christianity had prevail'd to be reverv'd for the Religion of the Empire, and to be supported and encouraged by the Laws of it, I cannot but think it highly probable, (if we may be allow'd to guess at the Counsels of infinite Wisdom,) that God was pleas'd to continue them till then, not so much for any necessity there was of them all that while for the evincing the Truth of the Christian Religion, as to supply the want of the Magistrate's Assistance.

You add further: *St.* Paul *knew no other means to make men hear,* P. 19. *but the Preaching of the Gospel; as will appear to any one who will read* Rom. 10. 14, &c. *Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God.* But whoever will *consider*, as well as *read* the Place, will find no such matter in it. St. *Paul* demands here, *How shall men hear without a Preacher?* But will any man say, Because a *Preacher*, or *Preaching* is always necessary, therefore nothing else can ever be so? If not, then it will not follow from this Demand, that the Apostle knew no other means to make men hear, but the preaching of the Gospel.

As to those words, vers. 17. Suppose the word ἀκοὴ there, to be rightly render'd *hearing*, and that *the word of God* signifies the word *preach'd*. Yet even so, every one sees they will serve your turn but just as well as the other. But if ἀκοὴ be there render'd *report* (and I do not see why it may not) as it is in the foregoing verse, (τίς ἐπίστευσε τῇ ἀκοῇ ἡμῶν; *Who has believed our report?*) then the sense will be, *Faith cometh by* report, *or* preaching; *and* preaching *by the word of God*, i. e. by the word of God instructing and *sending* the Preacher, according to vers. 15. Which sets that Text at a greater distance yet from your purpose.

Where to shew the Necessity of Penalties to bring men to *hearken to Instruction*, and to *consider* and *examine* matters of Religion as they ought to do, I allege that such as are out of the right Way, A. p. 10. are usually so prejudiced against it, that no intreaties or Perswasions will prevail with them so much as to give an ear to those who call them to it; so that there seems to be no other means left (besides the Grace of God) but Penalties onely, to bring them to *hear* and *consider*, and so to embrace the Truth; You demand, *What if God,* P. 20. *for Reasons best known to himself, would not have men compell'd to hear* (*i. e.* as far as moderate Penalties will *compell them*: otherwise I am not concern'd in this Demand:) *but thought the good Tidings*

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of Salvation, and the Propoſals of Life and Death, Means and Inducements enough to make them hear and conſider, now as well as heretofore? Where, *firſt*, you muſt give me leave to demand, How it appears that God thought the *good Tidings of Salvation*, &c. *enough heretofore*; when he endued the Preachers of the Goſpel with the Gift of Tongues, and with the Power of healing all manner of Diſeaſes, &c. as well to bring men to *hear* and *conſider*, as to *believe*? *Secondly* I ſay, that if God, *for Reaſons beſt known to himſelf*, would not have moderate Penalties uſed, now that Miracles are ceaſed, to induce men to *hear* and *conſider*, he would have told us ſo; and you ought to have ſhewn us where he has done it.

You go on, demanding, *What if God would have men left to their freedom in this Point, if they will hear, or if they will forbear, will you conſtrain them? Thus we are ſure he did with his own People*, &c. But thoſe words, *whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear*, which we find thrice uſed in the Prophet *Ezekiel*, are nothing at all to your purpoſe. For by *hearing* there, no man underſtands the bare *giving an ear* to what was to be preach'd, nor yet the *conſidering* it onely; but the *complying* with it, and *obeying* it: according to the Paraphraſe which *Grotius* gives of the words, *Ezek.* 2. 5. *Si ſe corrigunt, recte: ſi non (quod hactenus magis de illis credibile eſt, ob ſummam pertinaciam) exunt inexcuſati.* However, the Penalties I defend, are not ſuch as can any way be pretended to take away men's *freedom in this Point*.

P. 10, 11. You add, *This alſo is the Method of the Goſpel. We are Ambaſſadours for Chriſt, as if God did beſeech you by us, we pray in Chriſt's ſtead, ſaith St. Paul*, 2. *Cor* 5. 20. *If God had thought it neceſſary to have men puniſh'd to make them give ear, he could have call'd Magiſtrates to be Spreaders and Miniſters of the Goſpel, as well as poor Fiſhermen, or* Paul *a Perſecutor, who yet wanted not Power to puniſh where Puniſhment was neceſſary, as is evident in* Ananias *and* Saphira, *and the Inceſtuous* Corinthian. But though it be *the Method of the Goſpel*, for the *Miniſters* of it to *pray* and *beſeech* men; yet it appears from your own words here, both that *Puniſhment* may be ſometimes *neceſſary*, and that *puniſhing*, and that even by thoſe who are to *pray and beſeech*, is conſiſtent with that *Method*.

Why Penalties were not neceſſary at firſt, to make men give ear to the Goſpel, has already been ſhewn. And, from the ſame ground, it ſeems not hard to conjecture, why God was pleas'd to call *poor Fiſhermen*, rather than *Magiſtrates*, to be *Spreaders and Miniſters of the Goſpel*. For as the great and wonderful things which were

to

to be done for the evidencing the truth of the Goſpel, were abundantly ſufficient to procure Attention to it, without any help from the Magiſtrate; ſo they were much more *admirable* and convincing, as done by the hands of ſuch mean perſons, than they would have been, if they had been done by Princes or *Magiſtrates*. To which I may add, that the Converſion of the World to Chriſtianity, without the help, and notwithſtanding the utmoſt reſiſtance of the Civil Powers, was to be the great Evidence, to all ſucceeding Ages, of a divine Power accompanying the Goſpel, and furthering the progreſs of it: Which Evidence would have been wanting, if God had from the beginning uſed the ſervice of the *Magiſtrate* in propagating his Goſpel. *Acts* 4.13.

You demand further, *What if God, foreſeeing this Force would be in the hands of men as paſſionate, as humourſome, as liable to Prejudice and Error as the reſt of their Brethren, did not think it a proper Means to bring men into the Right Way?* But if there be any thing of an Argument in this, it proves that there ought to be no *Civil Government* in the World; and ſo proving too much, proves nothing at all. The Scripture tells us, that *the wrath of man worketh not the righteouſneſs of God.* And yet God has put the Sword into the Magiſtrate's hand, though he may be *as paſſionate, as humourſome, &c. as the reſt of his Brethren.* So that, unleſs you would have no Government, or Diſcipline in the World, you muſt acknowledge, that how *paſſionate* or *humourſome* ſoever, or how *liable* ſoever *to Prejudice and Error* God foreſaw Magiſtrates would be, there is not the leaſt colour to inferr from thence, that he did not think moderate Penalties, uſed to *bring men into the Right Way*, a *proper Means* to bring them into it P. 21. *Jam.* 1.20.

Laſtly you demand, *What if there be other Means?* And then you add, *Then yours ceaſes to be neceſſary, upon the account that there is no means left. For you your ſelf allow that the Grace of God is another Means. And I ſuppoſe you will not deny it to be both a proper and ſufficient Means; and which is more, the onely Means; ſuch Means as can work by it ſelf, and without which all the Force in the World can do nothing.* To which I anſwer: Though the *Grace of God* be *another Means*, and I thought fit to mention it, to prevent Cavils; yet it is none of the Means of which I was ſpeaking in the place you referr to; which any one who reads that Paragraph, will find to be onely *Humane* Means. And therefore though the *Grace of God* be *both a proper and ſufficient Means*, and *ſuch as can work by it ſelf*, and without which neither Penalties, nor any other A. p. 10.

Means

Means can do any thing; yet it may be true however, that when Admonitions and Intreaties fail, there is no *Humane Means* left, but Penalties, to bring prejudiced Perſons to hear and conſider what may convince them of their Errors, and diſcover the Truth to them. And then *Penalties* will be *neceſſary* in reſpect to that end, as an *Humane Means*.

What you intend by ſaying that the *Grace of God* is the *onely Means*, I do not well underſtand. If you mean onely that it is the *principal* and *moſt neceſſary* Means, and that without which all other Means are vain and ineffectual; I grant it is ſo. Or if you mean that it is the *onely neceſſary* Means, as being able to do its work without any help of other Means; This I have already granted. But if by calling it the *onely Means*, you intend to ſay that it does either always, or ordinarily exclude all other Means; I ſee no ground you have to ſay it.

Yes, ſay you: *God alone can open the Ear that it may hear, and open the Heart that it may underſtand.* But, by your favour, this does not prove that he makes uſe of no *Means* in doing it. For whatever Means we may ſuppoſe him to make uſe of, it is *he alone* ſtill that does it, though he does it by the Means he makes uſe of.

You add, *And this he does* (*i. e.* he *opens the Ear that it may hear, and the Heart that it may underſtand*) *in his own good time, and to whom he is graciouſly pleas'd, but not according to the Will and Phanſy of Man, when he thinks fit, by Puniſhments, to compell his Brethren.* By which I ſuppoſe you mean, that the Magiſtrate has no ground to hope that God will *bleſs* any Penalties that he may uſe, to bring men to *hear* and *conſider* the Doctrine of Salvation: or (which is the ſame thing) that God does not (at leaſt not ordinarily) afford his Grace and Aſſiſtance to them who are brought by ſuch Penalties to hear and conſider that Doctrine, to enable them to hear and conſider it as they ought, *i. e.* ſo as to be moved heartily to embrace it. If this be your meaning; then to let you ſee that it is not true, I ſhall onely deſire you to tell me, whether they that are ſo brought to *hear* and *conſider*, are bound to *believe* the Goſpel, or not? If you ſay they are; (and I ſuppoſe you dare not ſay otherwiſe;) then it evidently follows that God does afford them that Grace which is requiſite to enable them to believe the Goſpel: Becauſe without that Grace, it is impoſſible for them to believe it; and they cannot be bound to believe what it is impoſſible for them to believe.

You go on: *If God has pronounced againſt any Perſon or People, what*

what he did againſt the Jews (Iſai. 6. 10.) *Make the heart of this People fat, and make their ears heavy, and ſhut their eyes; leſt they ſee with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and underſtand with their hearts, and convert, and be heal'd; Will all the Force you can uſe, be a means to make them hear and underſtand and be converted?* No, Sir; it will not. But what then? What if God declares that he will not heal thoſe, who have long reſiſted all his ordinary Methods, and made themſelves, morally ſpeaking, incurable by them? (Which is the utmoſt you can make of the words you quote.) Will it follow from thence, that no good can be done by Penalties upon others, who are not ſo far gone in Wickedneſs and Obſtinacy? If it will not; as it is evident it will not; to what purpoſe is this ſaid? *Vid.* Mat. 13, 14, 15. & Act. 28. 25, 26, 27.

In the next place you attempt to *return* my *Argument*. And that you may do it the more ſucceſsfully, you repreſent it (as you commonly do) in ſuch a manner, as if I allow'd any Magiſtrate, of what Religion ſoever, to lay Penalties upon all that diſſent from him: Whereas in my own words it ſtands thus: 'When men fly 'from the means of a right Information, and will not ſo much as 'conſider how reaſonable it is, throughly and impartially to ex'amine a Religion which they embraced upon ſuch Inducements 'as ought to have no ſway at all in the matter, and therefore with 'little or no examination of the proper Grounds of it: What 'humane Method can be uſed, to bring them to act like Men, in 'an affair of ſuch conſequence, and to make a wiſer and more ra'tional choice, but that of laying ſuch Penalties upon them, as 'may balance the weight of thoſe Prejudices which enclined them 'to preferr a Falſe Way before the True, *&c?* Now this Argument you pretend to retort in this manner: *And I ſay, I ſee no other means left (taking the World as we now find it, wherein the Magiſtrate never lays Penalties, for Matters of Religion, upon thoſe of his own Church, nor is it to be expected they ever ſhould) to make men of the National Church, any where, throughly and impartially examine a Religion which they embraced upon ſuch Inducements as ought to have no ſway at all in the matter, and therefore with little or no examination of the proper Grounds of it. And therefore I conclude the uſe of Force by Diſſenters upon Conformiſts neceſſary.* And then you add, *I appeal to all the World, whether this be not as juſt and natural a Concluſion as yours.* And I am well content the *World* ſhould judge. And when it determines, that there is the ſame reaſon to ſay, That to bring thoſe who conform to the National P. 21, 22. A. p. 11.

Church, to examine their Religion, it is neceſſary for *Diſſenters* (who cannot poſſibly have the Coactive Power, becauſe the National Church has that on its ſide, and cannot be National without it) to *uſe Force upon Conformiſts*; As there is to ſay, That where the National Church is the true Church, there to bring *Diſſenters* (as you call them) to examine their Religion, it is neceſſary for the Magiſtrate (who has the Coactive Power) to lay moderate Penalties upon them for *diſſenting*: I ſay, when the *World* determines thus, I will never pretend any more to judge what is reaſonable, in any caſe whatſoever. For I doubt not but I may ſafely preſume that the *World* will eaſily admit theſe two things. 1. That though it be very fit and deſireable, that all that are of the true Religion, ſhould underſtand the true Grounds of it; that ſo they may be the better able both to defend themſelves againſt the aſſaults of Seducers, and to reduce ſuch as are out of the Way: yet this is not ſtrictly neceſſary to their Salvation: becauſe Experience ſhews (as far as men are capable to judge of ſuch matters) that many do heartily believe and profeſs the true Religion, and conſcientiouſly practice the Duties of it, who yet do not underſtand the true Grounds upon which it challenges their belief: And no man doubts but whoever does ſo believe, profeſs, and practice the true Religion, if he perſeveres to the end, ſhall certainly attain Salvation by it. 2. That how much ſoever it concerns thoſe who reject the true Religion (whom you may call *Diſſenters*, if you pleaſe) to examine and conſider why they do ſo; and how needful ſoever Penalties may be to bring them to this: it is, however, utterly unreaſonable that ſuch as have not the Coactive Power, ſhould take upon them to inflict Penalties for that purpoſe: Becauſe, as that is not conſiſtent with Order and Government; which cannot ſtand, where private perſons are permitted to uſurp the Coactive Power: So there is nothing more manifeſt, than that the prejudice which is done to Religion, and to the intereſt of men's Souls, by deſtroying Government, does infinitely outweigh any good that can poſſibly be done by that which deſtroys it. And whoever admits and conſiders theſe things, I am very ſecure he will be far enough from admitting, that there is any Parity of Reaſon in the Caſes we here ſpeak of, or that yours is as *juſt and natural a Concluſion* as mine.

What follows here, has been ſufficiently conſider'd already.

P. 21. You ſay, *Faith is the Gift of God.* And I ſay, This *Gift comes*, ordinarily at leaſt, *by hearing*. And if the Magiſtrate be both warranted

ranted and obliged to uſe convenient Penalties to bring his Subjects to *hear* the Goſpel; as I think I have ſhewn that he is; then, in doing ſo, he cannot be ſaid to *uſe any other means to procure this Gift to any one*, than *what God himſelf has preſcribed.*

If, ſay you, *all the means God has appointed, to make men hear and conſider, be Exhortation in ſeaſon and out of ſeaſon, &c. together with Prayer for them, and the Example of Meekneſs and a good Life; this is all ought to be done, whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear.* But if theſe be not *all the Means God has appointed*; then theſe things are not *all* that *ought to be done.* As to the firſt *Spreaders* of the Goſpel, it has already been ſhewn that God *appointed* other *Means*, beſides theſe, for them to uſe, to induce men to hear and conſider. And though when thoſe extraordinary Means ceaſed, theſe Means which you mention, were the onely Means left to the *Miniſters* of the Goſpel; yet that is no proof that the *Magiſtrate*, when he became Chriſtian, could not lawfully uſe ſuch Means as his Station enabled him to uſe, when they became needful.

By what *Means the Goſpel at firſt made it ſelf to be heard*, &c. *without the Aſſiſtance of any ſuch Force of the Magiſtrate*, as I *now think needful*, we have ſeen already. But whatever *Neglect* or *Averſion* there is in any, *impartially and throughly to inſtruct* the People, I wiſh it amended, and that the moſt effectual courſe may be taken for the amending it, as much as you can do. But I do not ſee how pertinent your Diſcourſe about this matter is, to the preſent Queſtion. For when you have made the beſt proviſion you can for the *Inſtruction* of the People, I fear a great part of them will ſtill need ſome moderate Penalties, to bring them to *hear* and receive *Inſtruction.* P. 23.

But *this new Method* of mine, *viz. the uſeing Force, not inſtead of Reaſon and Arguments, but onely to bring men to conſider those Reaſons and Arguments which are proper and ſufficient to convince them, but which, without being forced, they would not conſider*; Which I ſay, *no body can deny but that indirectly and at a diſtance, it does ſome ſervice towards the bringing men to embrace the Truth*: This *new Method* of mine, (as you will needs call it, though it be at leaſt as old as St. *Auſtin*) you tell me, *was never yet thought on by the moſt refined Perſecutors.* Which may be very true, for any thing I know: Though I think it hath been both *thought on*, and made uſe of too, by all thoſe Magiſtrates, who having made all requiſite proviſion for the inſtructing their People in the Truth, P. 24. A. p. 5. *Vid.* Aug. *Epiſt.* 48. & 50.

have likewiſe required them, under convenient Penalties, to embrace it.

But you ſay however, *It is not altogether unlike the Plea made uſe of to excuſe the late barbarous Uſage of the Proteſtants in* France (*deſigned to extirpate the Reform'd Religion there*) *from being a Perſecution for Religion.* For it ſeems, *the French King requires all his Subjects to come to Maſs.* Which they cannot lawfully do, nor he lawfully require them to do. But you go on: *Thoſe who do not come to Maſs, are puniſh'd with a witneſs. For what? Not for their Religion, ſay the Pleaders for that Diſcipline, but for diſobeying the King's Laws.* Whether thoſe *Pleaders* plead in this manner, or not, I know not. But if they do, I am ſure their *Plea* is ridiculous, and carries nothing at all of an *Excuſe* in it. For if true Religion, which is God's Law, forbids men to go to Maſs; then thoſe Laws can be no Laws, which require men to go to Maſs: unleſs Man can make Laws againſt God's Laws. And if thoſe Laws be no Laws, then 'tis groſly improper to talk of *diſobeying* them. For *where there is no Law, there can be no Tranſgreſſion*, or *Diſobedience*. Nor can any Act of Obedience to God (as all Acts which true Religion requires, are) be an Act of *Diſobedience* to any body. Now if thoſe Laws by which the *French* King requires his Subjects to come to Maſs, be no *Laws;* and conſequently their refuſing to come, be not a *diſobeying his Laws:* 'tis evident there is nothing left for which the Refuſers can be ſaid to be puniſh'd, but onely their *Religion*, which requires them to refuſe.

But let us ſee the *likeneſs* of my *new Method* to this *Plea*. *So*, ſay you, *by your Rule, the Diſſenters* (from the *true Religion*, for I ſpeak of no other) *muſt be puniſh'd* (or, if you pleaſe, ſubjected to moderate Penalties, ſuch as ſhall make them uneaſy, but neither deſtroy, nor undo them.) *For what? Not for their Religion, ſay you,* (So you tell me, Sir. But where, I beſeech you, do I *ſay* that Diſſenters from the true Religion, are not to be puniſh'd for *their* Religion?) *not for following the Light of their own Reaſon, not for obeying the Dictates of their own Conſciences.* No, Sir: but rather for the contrary. For the *Light of their own Reaſon*, and the *Dictates of their own Conſciences* (if their *Reaſon* and *Conſciences* were not perverted and abuſed) would undoubtedly lead them to the ſame thing, to which the Method we ſpeak of, is deſigned to bring them. You proceed: *For what then are they to be puniſh'd? To make them, ſay you, examine the Religion they have embraced, and the Religion they have rejected.* Right, Sir: That is indeed the

next.

next *End* for which they are to be puniſh'd. But what is that to your Queſtion? which, if it be pertinent, demands for what *Fault*, not for what *End*, they are to be puniſh'd: As appears even by your next words; *So that they are puniſh'd, not for having offended againſt a Law;* (*i.e.* not for any *Fault:*) *For there is no Law of the Land that requires them to examine.*

It ſeems then the *Likeneſs* of the two *Pleas* lies in this: The *Pleaders for the* French *Diſcipline* ſay that thoſe who refuſe to go to Maſs, are not puniſh'd for their Religion, but for *diſobeying the King's Laws.* Aud you make *me* ſay, that Diſſenters are to be puniſh'd *not for having offended againſt a Law.* And were there ever any Twinns more like than theſe two Pleas are?

But as if you had forgotten the *Likeneſs* you talk'd of, you conclude with theſe words; *And which now is the fairer Plea, pray judge.* So that the thing I am to *judge* of at laſt, is not, how *like* theſe *Pleas* are to each other; but which is the *fairer* Plea of them.

Now I confeſs, as you have made my Plea for me, I think there is no conſiderable difference as to the *Fairneſs* of them, excepting what ariſes from the different Degrees of Puniſhment in the *French* Diſcipline, and my Method. But if the *French* Plea be not true; and that which you make to be *mine*, be not mine: To what purpoſe is it to enquire, which is the *fairer* of them? The truth of the matter is this: The *French* Diſcipline *Dragoons* men, and many (as you ſay) out of their *lives*, for not *coming to Maſs* (which is no Fault,) to make them *come to Maſs* (which they cannot do without ſin.) And my Method puniſhes men with Puniſhments which do not deſerve to be call'd ſo, when compared with thoſe of the *French* Diſcipline, for rejecting the true Religion, propoſed to them with ſufficient Evidence, (which certainly is a Fault,) to bring them to conſider and examine the Evidence with which it is propoſed, that ſo they may embrace it, (which is both lawful for them, and their duty to do.) And which of theſe *Methods* or *Pleas* is the *fairer*, let all the World judge. P. 10.

Whereas you ſay here, that *there is no Law of the Land that requires men to examine*, I think the contrary is plain enough. For where the Laws provide ſufficient means of Inſtruction in the true Religion, and then require all men to embrace that Religion; I think the moſt natural Conſtruction of thoſe Laws is, that they require men to embrace it upon Inſtruction and Conviction; as it cannot be expected they ſhould do, without *examining* the Grounds upon which it ſtands.

How

How pertinent the Declamation is, which makes up the reſt of this Paragraph, appears ſufficiently by what has been ſaid, and will appear yet further, before I take leave of you.

P. 25. But that *this new ſort of Diſcipline may*, as you pretend, *have all fair play*, you come now to enquire at large into ſeveral Particulars relating to it: As namely, *Who it is I would have to be puniſh'd: For what I would have them puniſh'd: With what ſort of Penalties, what degree of Puniſhment they ſhould be forced: And how long they are to be puniſh'd.* And here, upon all theſe Heads, you diſcover, as you imagine, ſuch Difficulties and Inconſiſtencies, as are enough to ſpoil any Diſcipline in the World, and render it juſt good for nothing. But I hope I have not follow'd you thus cloſe hitherto to no purpoſe, but am apt to think that I have already abundantly laid open the Miſtakes and Cavils upon which thoſe Imaginations are grounded. And therefore having, as I ſuppoſe, ſufficiently prepared my way, I ſhall, without more adoe, addreſs my ſelf to manifeſt the *Conſiſtency* and *Practicableneſs* of my *new Method* (as you will have it) in the way you your ſelf preſcribe me,

P. 45. *viz.* by *telling the World plainly and directly,*

1. *Who are to be puniſh'd.*
2. *For what.*
3. *With what Puniſhments.*
4. *How long.*
5. *What Advantage to true Religion it would be, if Magiſtrates every where did ſo puniſh.*
6. *And laſtly, Whence the Magiſtrate had Commiſſion to do ſo.*

Which when I have done, and *by ſettling theſe Points have framed the parts of* my *new Engine, ſet it together, and ſhew'd that it will work, without doing more harm than good in the World,* you tell me you *think then men may be content to ſubmit to it.* Onely before I do this, I crave leave to take ſome notice of one of the Conditions you are pleas'd to lay upon me. For you require me to do it, not onely *plainly and intelligibly, without keeping in the uncertainty of*

P. 46. *general expreſſions* (which is reaſonable enough,) but likewiſe *without ſuppoſing all along* my *Church in the right*, and my *Religion the true.*

Now, as to this latter Condition, I confeſs I do not ſee how you can oblige me to it. For if my *Church* be *in the right;* and my *Religion* be the *true;* why may I not *all along ſuppoſe* it to be ſo?

You ſay *this can no more be allow'd* to me *in this caſe, whatever* my *Church or Religion be, than it can be to a Papiſt or a Lutheran, a Presby-*

Presbyterian or an Anabaptist; nay no more to me, *than it can be allow'd to a Jew or a Mahometan.* No, Sir? Not *whatever* my *Church, or Religion be?* That ſeems ſomewhat hard. And methinks you might have given us ſome Reaſon for what you ſay: For certainly it is not ſo ſelf-evident as to need no proof. But I think it is no hard matter to gueſs at your Reaſon, though you did not think fit expreſly to own it. For 'tis obvious enough that there can be no other Reaſon for this Aſſertion of yours, but either the equal *Truth*, or at leaſt the equal *Certainty* (or *Uncertainty*) of all Religions. For whoever conſiders your Aſſertion, muſt ſee, that to make it good, you will be obliged to maintain one of theſe two things: Either 1. That no Religion is *the true Religion*, in oppoſition to other Religions: Which makes all Religions *true*, or all *falſe*, and ſo either way *indifferent*. Or, 2. That though ſome one Religion be *the true Religion*; yet no man can have any more reaſon, than another man of another Religion may have, to believe his to be *the true Religion*. Which makes all Religions equally *certain* (or *uncertain*; whether you pleaſe) and ſo renders it vain and idle to enquire after *the true Religion*, and onely a piece of good luck if any man be of it, and ſuch good luck as he can never know that he has, till he come into the other World. Whether of theſe two Principles you will own, I know not. But certainly one or the other of them *lies at the bottom* with you, and is the *lurking Suppoſition upon which you build all that you ſay.*

But as unreaſonable as this Condition is, I ſee no need I have to decline it, nor any occaſion you had to impoſe it upon me. For certainly the making what you call my new Method, *conſiſtent* and *practicable*, does no way oblige me to *ſuppoſe all along* my Religion the *true*, as you imagine. No, Sir; 'tis enough for that purpoſe, to ſuppoſe that there is *one true Religion*, and but one; and that that Religion may be *known* by thoſe who profeſs it, to be the onely true Religion; and may alſo be *manifeſted* to be ſuch, by them to others, ſo far at leaſt as to oblige them to receive it, and to leave them without excuſe if they do not. Indeed if either of the two Principles but now mention'd, be true, *i. e.* if all Religions be equally *true*, and ſo *indifferent*; or all be equally *certain* (or *uncertain*:) then without more adoe, the Cauſe is yours. For then, 'tis plain, there can be no reaſon why any man, in reſpect to his Salvation, ſhould change his Religion: and ſo there can be no room for uſing any manner of Force, to bring men to conſider what may reaſonably move them to change. But if, on the contrary,

there

there be one true Religion, and no more; and that may be known to be the onely true Religion by those who are of it; and may by them be manifested to others, in such sort as has been said: then 'tis altogether as plain, that it may be very reasonable and necessary for some men to change their Religion; and that it may be made appear to them to be so. And then if such men will not consider what is offer'd, to convince them of the Reasonableness and Necessity of doing it; it may be very fit and reasonable, for any thing you have said to the contrary, in order to the bringing them to Consideration, to require them under convenient Penalties, to forsake their false Religions, and to embrace the true. Now as these things are all that I need to *suppose*; so I shall take leave to suppose them, till you shew good reason why I should not.

And now I come to give an account of the Particulars mention'd. Which I think may be done in a very few words so *plainly* and *intelligibly*, upon these Suppositions, as to enable any Reader to see, without any more help, to how little purpose you multiply words about these matters. Here therefore I am to *tell the World*,

1. *Who are to be punish'd.* And those, according to the whole tenor of my *Answer*, are no other but such, as having sufficient Evidence tender'd them of the true Religion, do yet reject it; whether utterly refusing to consider that Evidence, or not considering it as they ought, *viz.* with such care and diligence as the matter deserves and requires, and with honest and unbiass'd minds. And what difficulty there is in this, I cannot imagine. For there is nothing more evident, than that those who do so reject the true Religion, are *culpable*, and *deserve* to be punish'd. And it is easy enough to *know* when men do so reject the true Religion. For that requires no more than that we know that that Religion was tender'd to them with sufficient Evidence of the truth of it. And that it *may* be tender'd to men with such Evidence; and that it may be *known* when it is so tender'd; these things, you know, I take leave here to suppose. Now if the persons I describe, do really *deserve* to be punish'd; and may be *known* to be such as I describe them; then as they *deserve* to be punish'd; so they *may* be punish'd. Which is all that needs be said upon this Head, to shew the *Consistency* and *Practicableness* of this *Method*. And what do you any where say against this?

2. *For what.* By which I perceive you mean two things. For sometimes you speak of the *Fault*, and sometimes of the *End* for which men are to be punish'd. And sometimes you plainly con-

found

found them.) Now if it be enquired, For what *Fault* men are to be puniſh'd: I anſwer, For rejecting the true Religion, after ſufficient Evidence tender'd them of the truth of it: Which certainly is a *Fault*, and deſerves Puniſhment. But if you enquire for what *End* ſuch as do ſo reject the true Religion, are to be puniſh'd: I ſay, To bring them to embrace the true Religion; and, in order to that, to bring them to conſider, and that carefully and impartially, the Evidence which is offer'd, to convince them of the truth of it: Which are undeniably juſt and excellent Ends; and which, through God's bleſſing, have often been procured, and may yet be procured by convenient Penalties, inflicted for that purpoſe. Nor do I know of any thing you ſay againſt any part of this, which is not already anſwer'd.

3. *With what Puniſhments.* Now here having in my *Anſwer* declared, that I take the *Severities* ſo often mention'd, (which either deſtroy men, or make them miſerable) to be *utterly unapt and improper* (for Reaſons there given) *to bring men to embrace the Truth which muſt ſave them;* I do not preſume to determine (nor have you ſhewn any cauſe why I ſhould) juſt how far, within thoſe bounds, that Force extends it ſelf, which is really ſerviceable to that end; but content my ſelf to ſay, 'That ſo much Force, or 'ſuch Penalties as are ordinarily ſufficient to prevail with men of 'common Diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate, 'to weigh matters of Religion carefully and impartially; and with-'out which ordinarily they will not do this; ſo much Force, or 'ſuch Penalties may fitly and reaſonably be uſed for the promoting 'true Religion in the World, and the Salvation of Souls. And what juſt exception this is liable to, I do not underſtand. A. p. 14.

For when I ſpeak of men of *common Diſcretion, and not deſperately perverſe and obſtinate*, I think 'tis plain enough, that by *common Diſcretion* I exclude not *Idiots* onely, and ſuch as we uſually call *Mad-men*, but likewiſe the *deſperately perverſe and obſtinate*, who perhaps may well enough deſerve that name, though they be not wont to be ſent to *Bedlam*. P. 41.

And if the Penalties I ſpeak of, be intended for the curing men's unreaſonable *Prejudices* and *Refractarineſs* againſt the true Religion; then the reaſon why the *deſperately perverſe and obſtinate* are not to be regarded in meaſuring theſe Penalties, is very apparent. For as Remedies are not provided for the *incurable*, ſo in the preparing and tempering them, regard is to be had onely to thoſe for whom they are deſigned. P. 42.

Perhaps it may be needful here (to prevent a little Cavil) to note, that there are *degrees* of Perverſneſs and Obſtinacy; and that men may be *perverſe and obſtinate*, without being *deſperately* ſo: And that therefore ſome *perverſe* and *obſtinate* perſons may be thought curable, though ſuch as are *deſperately* ſo cannot. (As there are likewiſe *degrees* of *Careleßneß* in men of their Salvation, as well as of *Concern* for it: So that ſuch as have *ſome* Concern for their Salvation, may yet be *careleß* of it to a great degree. And therefore if thoſe who have *any* Concern for their Salvation, deſerve regard and pity; then ſo may *ſome* carleſs perſons, though
A. p. 26. thoſe *who have no Concern for their Salvation, deſerve not to be conſider'd.* Which ſpoils a little Harangue you give us, *Pag.* 43.)

And as thoſe Med'cines are thought ſafe and adviſable, which do *ordinarily* cure, though not always (as none do:) So thoſe Penalties, or Puniſhments, which are *ordinarily* found ſufficient (as well as neceſſary) for the ends for which they are deſigned, may fitly and reaſonably be uſed for the compaſſing thoſe ends.

Now I do not ſee what more can be required to juſtify the Rule
P. 40. here given. For if you demand that it ſhould expreſs what Penalties, particularly, are ſuch as it ſays may *fitly* and *reaſonably be uſed:* this, you muſt give me leave to tell you, is a very unreaſonable Demand. For what Rule is there that expreſſes the Particulars which agree with it? A Rule is intended for a *common Meaſure*, by which Particulars are to be examined; and therefore muſt neceſſarily be general. And thoſe to whom it is given, are ſuppoſed to be able to apply it, and to judge of Particulars by it. Nay it is often ſeen, that they are better able to do this, than thoſe who give it. And ſo it is in the preſent caſe: The Rule here laid down, is that by which I ſuppoſe Governers and Lawgivers ought to examine the Penalties they uſe, for the promoting the true Religion, and the Salvation of Souls. But certainly no man doubts but their Prudence and Experience enables them to uſe and apply it better than other men; and to judge more exactly what Penalties do agree with it, and what do not. And therefore I think you muſt excuſe me, if I do not take upon me to teach them, what it becomes me rather to learn from them.

P. 43, 44. 4. *How long they are to be puniſh'd.* And of this the account is very eaſy. For certainly nothing is more reaſonable, than that men ſhould be ſubject to puniſhment as long as they continue to offend. And as long as men reject the true Religion, tender'd them with ſufficient Evidence of the Truth of it, ſo long, 'tis certain,

they

they offend: Becauſe it is impoſſible for any man, innocently to reject the true Religion, ſo tender'd to him. For whoever rejects that Religion ſo tender'd, does either apprehend and perceive the Truth of it, or he does not. If he does; I know not what greater Crime any man can be guilty of. If he does not perceive the Truth of it; there is no account to be given of that, but either that he ſhuts his eyes againſt the Evidence which is offer'd him, and will not at all conſider it; or that he does not conſider it as he ought, *viz.* with ſuch care as is requiſite, and with a ſincere deſire to learn the Truth: Either of which does manifeſtly involve him in guilt.

To ſay here that a man who has the true Religion propoſed to him with ſufficient Evidence of its Truth, may conſider it as he ought, or *do his utmoſt in conſidering*, and yet not perceive the Truth of it; is neither more nor leſs, than to ſay, that ſufficient Evidence is not ſufficient Evidence. For what does any man mean by ſufficient Evidence, but ſuch as will certainly win aſſent, wherever it is duly conſider'd?

'Tis plain enough therefore, that as long as men reject the true Religion duly propoſed to them, ſo long they offend, and deſerve Puniſhment: And therefore it is but juſt, that *ſo long* they ſhould be left liable to it.

But becauſe my Deſigne does rather oblige me to conſider *how long* men may *need* Puniſhment, than *how long* it may be *juſt* to puniſh them; therefore I ſhall add, That as long as men refuſe to embrace the true Religion, *ſo long* Penalties are neceſſary for them, to diſpoſe them to conſider and embrace it: And that therefore, as Juſtice allows, ſo Charity requires that they be kept ſubject to Penalties, *till* they embrace the true Religion.

Thus far you proceed in your *Enquiry*. But you demand that I ſhould alſo *tell the World*,

5. *What Advantage to true Religion it would be, if Magiſtrates every where did ſo puniſh.* Where by the Magiſtrates *ſo puniſhing*, if you ſpeak to the purpoſe, you muſt mean their puniſhing men for rejecting the true Religion (ſo tender'd to them as has been ſaid) in order to the bringing them to conſider, and embrace it. Now before we can ſuppoſe Magiſtrates every where *ſo to puniſh*, we muſt ſuppoſe the true Religion to be every where the National Religion. And if this were the caſe, I think it is evident enough, *what Advantage to true Religion it would be, if Magiſtrates every where did ſo puniſh*. For then we might reaſonably hope that all falſe Religions would ſoon vaniſh, and the True become once more

the onely Religion in the World: Whereas if Magiſtrates ſhould not *ſo puniſh;* it were much to be fear'd (eſpecially conſidering what has already happen'd) that on the contrary, falſe Religions, and Atheiſm, as more agreeable to the Soil, would dayly take deeper root, and propagate themſelves, till there were no room left for the true Religion (which is but a foreign Plant) in any corner of the World.

6. *And laſtly, Whence the Magiſtrate had Commiſſion to do ſo.* But of this I have ſpoken already, and need not here repeat what has been ſaid, to ſhew, that the Magiſtrate receives his *Commiſſion ſo to puniſh* as has been expreſs'd, from *God*, whoſe *Miniſter* he is.

Thus in anſwer to your demand, I have given a plain account of the Particulars you mention. And I ſhall now leave the World to judge, whether what you call a *new ſort of Diſcipline*, and my
P. 46. *new Method*, be an *impracticable Chimæra*, as you are pleas'd to ſay it is.

P. 46. And now, having *ſeen and examined*, as you ſay, *the main* of my *Treatiſe*, you tell me you *think* you *might here end without going any farther*. And ſo, Sir, I think you might, for any thing you have ſaid againſt the reſt of it. But that I may not *think my ſelf, or any of* my *Arguments neglected*, you promiſe to *go over the remainder*. And ſo there is no help for it, but I muſt wait upon you.

P. 46. But you muſt excuſe me, if I do not here prove over again, that what I make to be the Author's *Fourth Propoſition*, is really *his* Propoſition, and that his *laſt Propoſition* is *wholly built* upon *that*.

P. 46. You ſay the buſineſs of my next Paragraph is to prove, *That if Force be uſeful, then ſomebody muſt certainly have a right to uſe it:* And that *the firſt Argument* I go *about to prove it by, is this, That Uſefulneſs is as good an Argument to prove there is ſomewhere a right to uſe it, as Uſeleſsneſs is to prove no body has ſuch a right:* Whereas neither is that *my Propoſition*, nor this *my Argument*. For my
A. p. 15. words are theſe: 'If there be ſo great Uſe and Neceſſity of out-'ward Force (duly temper'd and applied) for the promoting true 'Religion, and the Salvation of Souls, as I have endeavour'd to 'ſhew there is: this is as good an Argument to prove that there is 'ſomewhere a right to uſe ſuch Force for that purpoſe, as the 'utter Uſeleſsneſs of Force (if that could be made out) would be, 'to prove that no body has any ſuch right. Where every one ſees that I do not inferr *a right to uſe Force* from the *Uſefulneſs of it* barely (as you make me,) but from the *Neceſſity*, as well as *Uſefulneſs* of it. For though the utter *Uſeleſsneſs* of Force (if it could

could be made out) would, as I here acknowledge, be a good Argument to prove that no body has any right to uſe it; yet I never thought that the bare *Uſefulneſs* of it was ſufficient to prove that there is a right ſomewhere to uſe it. But if Force be both *uſeful* and *neceſſary*; that, I think, is a good proof of it: And that is the thing I inſiſt upon.

You might therefore have ſpared the pains you have taken to prove that *Uſefulneſs of Puniſhment cannot give a Commiſſion to puniſh*; or that *uſeful Puniſhment from every hand is not lawful*: For I never aſſerted the contrary. But becauſe ſome perhaps may think that there is more in the Inſtance you here make uſe of, than what you intend to prove by it; it may not be amiſs briefly to ſhew there is not. P. 47.

That Inſtance is this: You ſay *a man may have the Stone, and it may be uſeful (more than indirectly and at a diſtance uſeful) to him to be cut; but yet this uſefulneſs will not juſtify the moſt skilful Chirurgeon in the world, by Force to make him endure the pain and hazard of Cutting; becauſe he has no commiſſion, no right, without the Patient's own conſent to do ſo. Nor is it a good Argument, Cutting will be uſeful to him; therefore there is a right ſomewhere to cut him, whether he will or no.* Now that this Inſtance does not come up to the Point in queſtion between us, is very evident. For 1. It is to be conſider'd, That the *Stone* does not always *kill*, though it be not cured; but men do often live to a great age with it, and die at laſt of other Diſtempers. But *Averſion to the true Religion* is certainly and inevitably mortal to the Soul, if not cured; and ſo of abſolute neceſſity to be cured. And yet if we ſhould ſuppoſe the *Stone* as certainly deſtructive of this temporal life, as that *Averſion* is of men's eternal Salvation: even ſo, the neceſſity of curing it would be as much leſs, than the neceſſity of curing that Averſion, as this *temporal Life* falls ſhort in value of that which is *eternal*. And 2. It may be conſider'd, That *Cutting for the Stone* is not always *neceſſary*, in order to the Cure: And that even where it is moſt ſo, it is withall *hazardous* by your own confeſſion, and may kill, as well as cure, and that without any fault of the Patient. But the *Penalties* I ſpeak of, as they are altogether *neceſſary* (without extraordinary Grace) to cure that pernicious, and otherwiſe untractable *Averſion*; ſo they can no way endanger or hurt the Soul, but by the fault of him that undergoes them. And if theſe things be true; if there be no ſuch Neceſſity that perſons troubled with the Stone ſhould be cured of it, as there is, that ſuch,

as

as are poſſeſs'd with an Averſion to the true Religion ſhould be cured of that Averſion; And if Cutting for the Stone, be neither ſo neceſſary, nor yet ſo ſafe a Means of curing, as moderate Penalties are in the other caſe: Then how reaſonable ſoever you may ſuppoſe it, that it ſhould be left to the Patient's choice, whether he ſhall be *cut* or not; and how true ſoever it may be, that the moſt *skilful Chirurgeon in the world has no Commiſſion, no right, without the Patient's own conſent, by Force to make him endure the pain and hazard of Cutting;* The Magiſtrate may nevertheleſs have a right to uſe Penalties to cure men of their Averſion to the true Religion: For 'tis plain enough, theſe things may very well ſtand together.

This may ſuffice to ſhew, how ſhort this Inſtance falls of the Caſe before us. However I ſhall add, That though, as things now ſtand, no Chirurgeon has any right to *cut* his Calculous Patient, without his conſent; yet if the Magiſtrate ſhould by a Publick Law appoint and authorize a competent number of the moſt skilful in that Art, to viſit ſuch as labour under that Diſeaſe, and to cut thoſe (whether they conſent or not) whoſe Lives they unanimouſly judge it impoſſible to ſave otherwiſe: I am apt to think you would find it hard to prove, that in ſo doing he exceeded the bounds of his Power: And I am ſure it would be as hard to prove, that thoſe Artiſts would have no right, in that caſe, to cut ſuch Perſons.

Whereas you ſay in this Paragraph, that to juſtify Puniſhment, it is requiſite that it be *directly uſeful for the procuring ſome greater good*, than that which it *takes away;* I wiſh you had told us why it muſt needs be *directly* uſeful for that purpoſe: or why Penalties are not as *directly uſeful* for the bringing men to the true Religion, as *the rod of correction* is to *drive fooliſhneſs from a Child*, or to work *wiſdom* in him.

Prov. 22. 15. —29. 15.

P. 47, 48. Why Force was not *neceſſary* for the firſt 300 *years after Chriſt*, has already been ſhewn. And whoever conſiders the account which has been given of that matter, will eaſily ſee, that unleſs that which made Force *needleſs* then, does ſtill continue; it may be *neceſſary now*, though it was not *then*.

But here you think you put me a very confounding Queſtion.

P. 48. *If*, ſay you, *your ſuppoſed Uſefulneſs* (*and Neceſſity*, you ſhould have added) *places a right ſomewhere to uſe it, pray tell me in whoſe hands it places it in* Turky, Perſia, *or* China, *or any Country where Chriſtians of different Churches live under a Heathen or* Mahometan

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Sovereign? But, Sir, I anſwer roundly and plainly, In the hands of the Sovereign. What? (will you ſay) *a right in* Mahometan *or Pagan Princes hands to uſe Force upon Chriſtians, for fear* (as you ſpeak) *leſt mankind, in thoſe Countries, ſhould be unfurniſh'd with means for the promoting God's honour and the good of Souls?* No, Sir: but a right to uſe convenient Penalties for the promoting the true Religion; which I think is the *promoting God's honour and the good of Souls.*

If this ſtartle you; then I muſt tell you further, that I look upon the Supreme Power to be the ſame all the World over, in what hands ſoever it is placed: And I take this Right to be contain'd in it. And if thoſe that have it, do not uſe it as they ought, but inſtead of promoting true Religion by proper Penalties, ſet themſelves to enforce *Mahometaniſm*, or *Paganiſm*, or any other falſe Religion: all that can, or that needs be ſaid to that matter is, that God will one day call them to an account for their neglect of their Duty, for the Diſhonour they do to him, and for the Souls that periſh by their fault.

You ſay, *The Author having endeavour'd to ſhew that no body at all, of any rank or condition, had a power to puniſh, torment, or uſe any man ill, for matters of Religion; you tell us you do not yet underſtand why Clergy-men are not as capable of ſuch Power as other men.* Which is ſaid with the ſame Ingenuity which you have uſed in other places. For whoever will but conſult the place, muſt ſee that the Power I ſpeak of, is *externally coactive Power*, in general, and not a *Power to puniſh, torment, or uſe men ill, for matters of Religion*, as you make it to be. And whether the Author did, or did not give me *any occaſion*, in a ſhort *Parentheſis* to declare my diſſent from thoſe who think Clergy-men incapable of *externally coactive Power*, I think the fortune of *Europe* does not depend upon it. But it ſeems you wanted an *occaſion* to ſhew your good will towards the *Clergy*, and ſo you made your ſelf one.

P. 48, 49.

A. p. 17.

Your next Paragraph is ſo groſs and palpable a Miſtake at leaſt, that I can hardly think fit to ſpend any words about it. In ſhort thus it is. Page 18. of my *Anſwer* I have theſe words: 'That 'Commonwealths are inſtituted for theſe ends (*viz.* for the *procu-'ring, preſerving and advancing men's Civil Intereſts*) no man will 'deny. But if there be any other ends beſides theſe, attainable by 'Civil Society and Government; there is no reaſon to affirm that 'theſe are the onely Ends for which they are deſigned. Doubtleſs 'Commonwealths are inſtituted for the attaining of all the Bene-'fits

P. 50.

'fits which Political Government can yield. And therefore if the 'Spiritual and Eternal Intereſts of men may any way be procured 'or advanced by Political Government; the procuring and advan-'cing thoſe Intereſts muſt in all reaſon be reckon'd among the Ends 'of Civil Societies, and ſo, conſequently, fall within the compaſs 'of the Magiſtrate's Juriſdiction. Where I think it is plain enough to any Reader, that by thoſe words, *Doubtleſs Commonwealths are inſtituted for the attaining of all the Benefits which Political Government can yield*, I deſign to prove, not *that there be other Ends attainable &c.* but that *if there be*, there is then *no reaſon to affirm that the procuring, preſerving and advancing men's Civil Intereſts are the onely Ends for which Commonwealths are deſigned.* And yet you ſay here, *How do you prove there be other Ends? Why thus. Doubtleſs Commonwealths are inſtituted for the attaining all the Benefits which Political Government can yield.* And leaſt the Reader ſhould not take ſufficient notice of it, you repeat it again: *The Queſtion is*, ſay you, *Whether Civil Society be inſtituted onely for Civil Ends? You ſay, No; and your proof is, Becauſe, Doubtleſs it is inſtituted for other Ends.* Now, Sir, I will not ſay, *Doubtleſs*, when you wrote this, you were conſcious that you miſrepreſented my Argument; (though it be very hard to think you were not:) But all the World will allow me to ſay, *Doubtleſs*, if you were conſcious, you did what no Fair-dealer would have done.

P. 50. Though it be very true, that *the Author offers three Conſiderations to prove that the Civil Power neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the Salvation of Souls;* yet it may be true alſo, that he does but *beg the Queſtion*, when he affirms that *the the Commonwealth is conſtituted only for the procuring, preſerving and advancing the Civil Intereſts of the Members of it.* For certainly this Affirmation, and that which he goes about to prove by thoſe *Conſiderations*, are not the ſame thing.

P. 51. But you ſay the Author *does not beg the Queſtion. For that being, Whether Civil Intereſt be the onely End of Civil Society, he gives this reaſon for the Negative; That Civil Power has nothing to do with the Salvation of Souls.* But, in my opinion, you would have come nearer the truth, if you had ſaid (juſt the reverſe) that the *Queſtion* being, *Whether Civil Power has any thing to do with the Salvation of Souls*, the Author gives this Reaſon for the Negative, *That Civil Intereſt is the onely End of Civil Society.* For the very truth of the matter is this. The *Queſtion* being, *Whether the Magiſtrate has any right to uſe any kind of Force or Penalties, to bring men to the*

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true Religion, the Author holds the Negative, and in order to the proving it, advances this Principle, That *the Commonwealth is constituted onely for the procuring, preserving, and advancing men's Civil Interests*; or, as you express it, That *Civil Interest is the onely End of Civil Society*. Consequently to which he affirms, That *Civil Power has nothing to do with the Salvation of Souls*; and thence inferrs the Point he undertook to prove, *viz.* That *the Magistrate has no right to use any kind of Force or Penalties, to bring men to the true Religion, in order to the Salvation of their Souls*. Now this I acknowledge to be a very good way of proving the Conclusion, if that Principle be true: But that I think no man is bound to grant: and I suppose I have shewn sufficient reason why I think so. And therefore because our Author assumes that Principle, without proving it, I said, and do now again say, that he does but *beg the Question*. 'Tis true, he offers *three Considerations* afterwards, to prove the same thing which he designed to support by that Principle. But what is that to the business? Will it follow from thence, that he does not *beg the Question*, when he takes that for a Principle, which his Adversaries are as far from granting, as they are from granting the Conclusion he intends to establish by it? This you will never be able to shew. L. p. 6. L. p. 6, 7.

And now, say you, *let us examine the truth of your main Position, viz. That Civil Society is instituted for the attaining all the Benefits that it may any way yield.* But what if this which you call my *main Position*, be no *Position* at all of mine? That which I say, is, 'That Commonwealths, or Civil Societies are instituted for the attaining of all the Benefits which Political Government can yield, 'or for all the Ends which are attainable by Civil Society and Government: (not, by *the Civil Society*, as you make it, where you pretend to set down my words.) Now I suppose there is some difference between *Civil Society*, and *a Civil Society* or Commonwealth. *A Civil Society* all men understand to be a Collection or Multitude of Men living together under the same Political Laws and Government. But *Civil Society* is nothing else but men's living so together: That is, it is not *a Civil Society*, but that which *makes* a Collection of men *a Civil Society*. P. 51. A. p. 18. P. 50.

Neither do I say, That Commonwealths, or Civil Societies are instituted for the attaining of all the Benefits *they* can yield, (as you insinuate;) which is very improper: For *Civil Societies* do onely *attain* and *enjoy* the Benefits, which *Civil Society* or Government *yields*. And accordingly I say they are instituted for the at-

attaining of all the Benefits which *Civil Society*, or *Political Government can yield.*

And this I took to be ſo plain a Truth, that I thought it no great boldneſs to uſher it in with a *Doubtleſs*. And I confeſs I am ſtill ſo much of the ſame mind, that I can hardly believe that any man, who has not a very urgent occaſion, will make any queſtion of it. For if what has hitherto been univerſally acknowledged, be true, *viz.* That *no Power is given in vain*, but to be *uſed* upon occaſion; I think a very little *Logick* may ſerve a man to draw this Concluſion from it, That all Societies are inſtituted for the attaining *all the good*, or *all the benefits* they are *enabled* to attain: Becauſe if you except any of thoſe benefits, you will be obliged to admit, that the *Power* of attaining them was given in vain. Nor will it follow from hence, that *all Societies are inſtituted for one and the ſame End* (as you imagine it will,) unleſs you ſuppoſe all Societies enabled, by the Powers they are endued with, to attain the ſame End: which I believe no man hitherto did ever affirm. And therefore, notwithſtanding this Poſition, there may be ſtill as great a *difference* as you pleaſe, *between Church and State; a Commonwealth and an Army; or between a Family and the* Eaſt-India *Company*. Which ſeveral Societies, as they are inſtituted for different *Ends*, ſo are they likewiſe furniſh'd with different *Powers*, proportionate to their reſpective *Ends*.

P. 51, 52. To your next Paragraph, after what has already been ſaid, I think it may ſuffice to ſay as follows. Though *perhaps the Peripatetick Philoſophy may not be true*; (and *perhaps* it is no great matter, if it be not:) yet the true Religion is undoubtedly *true*. And though *perhaps a great many have not time, nor Parts to ſtudy* that Philoſophy; (and *perhaps* it may be no great matter neither, if they have not:) yet all that have the true Religion duly tender'd them, *have time*, and all, but Idiotes and Mad-men, *have Parts* likewiſe to *ſtudy it*, as much as it is neceſſary for them to ſtudy it. And though *perhaps a great many who have ſtudied* that Philoſophy, *cannot be convinced of the truth of it*; (which *perhaps* is no great wonder:) yet no man ever *ſtudied* the true Religion with ſuch care and diligence as he might and ought to uſe, and with an honeſt mind, but he was *convinced of the truth of it*. And that thoſe who cannot otherwiſe be brought to do this, ſhould be a little *diſturb'd and diſeas'd* to bring them to it, I take to be the Intereſt, not onely of thoſe particular perſons who by this means may be brought into the way of Salvation, but of the *Commonwealth* likewiſe, upon

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theſe two accounts. 1. Becauſe the true Religion, which this Method propagates, makes good Men; and good Men are always the beſt Subjects, or Members of a Commonwealth; not onely as they do more ſincerely and zealouſly promote the Publick Good, than other men; but likewiſe in regard of the favour of God, which they often procure to the Societies of which they are Members. And 2. Becauſe this Care in any Commonwealth, of God's Honour and Men's Salvation, entitles it to his ſpecial protection and bleſſing. So that where this Method is uſed, it proves both a *Spiritual* and a *Civil Benefit* to the *Commonwealth*.

You ſay I ſpeak *very improperly, or rather very miſtakenly*, if I call *ſuch Benefits as may any way* (i. e. *indirectly, and at a diſtance, or by Accident*) *be attain'd by Civil, or any other Society, the Ends for which it is inſtituted*: Whereas indeed the *Miſtake* lies on your ſide, (which I muſt now again put you in mind of) in thinking that by *indirectly and at a diſtance*, I mean *by Accident*, in your ſenſe; which I no where gave you any occaſion to think. And therefore I can eaſily admit, that *nothing can in reaſon be reckon'd among the Ends of any Society, but what may in reaſon be ſuppoſed to be deſigned by thoſe who enter into it*. (Though I ſee no reaſon, why the Author or Inſtitutor of any Society, eſpecially of Civil Society, may not be ſuppoſed to deſign more than thoſe uſually do, who enter into it.) But what follows from this? Why, you ſay, *No body can in reaſon ſuppoſe that any one enter'd into Civil Society for the procuring, ſecuring, or advancing the Salvation of his Soul; when he, for that end, needed not the Force of Civil Society*. So that it ſeems, the reaſon why the procuring, ſecuring, or advancing the Salvation of Souls, muſt not be reckon'd among the Ends of Civil Societies, is, becauſe there is no *need of the Force of Civil Society* for that End: The contrary whereof has, I ſuppoſe, already been ſufficiently made good.

P. 52, 53.

But whereas I ſay, 'Doubtleſs Commonwealths are inſtituted for 'the attaining of all the Benefits which Political Government can 'yield; and therefore &c. *Upon the ſame Grounds*, ſay you, *thus I reaſon. Doubtleſs Churches are inſtituted for the attaining of all the Benefits which Eccleſiaſtical Government can yield: And therefore if the Temporal and Secular Intereſts of Men may any way be procured, or advanced by Eccleſiaſtical Politie; the procuring and advancing thoſe Intereſts muſt in all reaſon be reckon'd among the Ends of Religious Societies, and ſo conſequently fall within the compaſs of Churchmen's Juriſdiction*. Well, Sir; I admit the Conſequence,

A. p. 18.

P. 53.

and do freely own *the procuring and advancing the Temporal and Secular Intereſts of Men*, to be one of the *Ends* (an inferiour, or ſecundary End) *of Religious Societies*, &c. And what do you conclude from thence? Why, *The Church of Rome*, you ſay, *has openly made its advantage of Secular Intereſts to be procured or advanced, indirectly, and at a diſtance, and* in ordine ad ſpiritualia; *all which ways* (*if I miſtake not Engliſh*) *are comprehended under your* any way. *But I do not remember that any of the Reformed Churches have hitherto directly profeſs'd it. But there is a time for all things.* So that it ſeems, what the Church of *Rome* has openly made its advantage of, I am endeavouring to bring it in at a back-door, to the Reformed Churches: For that I take to be the thing you would inſinuate by theſe words. But what is it, I beſeech you, that the Church of *Rome* has *openly made its advantage of?* For I confeſs I do not underſtand what you mean by *Secular Intereſts to be procured or advanced indirectly, and at a diſtance, and* in ordine ad ſpiritualia. That ſome of the Biſhops of *Rome* have made their advantage of a Power they claim'd, to diſpoſe of all Secular matters as they thought fit, even to the depoſing of Kings and Emperours, and the beſtowing their Dominions on whomſoever they pleas'd; And that they claim'd this Power as belonging to them (at leaſt as *Bellarmine* minces the matter) not *directly* and *immediately* (*i.e.* not for the *procuring or advancing men's Secular Intereſts*) but onely *indirectly* and *at a diſtance*, viz. *in ordine ad ſpiritualia;* This is very notorious, and cannot be denied. But is there no difference between *Temporal Power* and *Politie*, and *Eccleſiaſtical Politie* or *Government*, conſiſting in the exerciſe of *Spiritual Power* onely? between *Temporal Power*, paramount to all the Power of the Kings of the Earth, and *Eccleſiaſtical Politie*, ſubject to be many ways limited and regulated by the Civil Power? between procuring or advancing *Spiritual Intereſts* by ſuch an infinite Temporal Power and Secular Politie, and procuring and advancing men's *Temporal* and *Secular Intereſts* by Eccleſiaſtical Politie or Government, onely as the Civil Power ſhall require, or allow? Had you told us truly and plainly, what it is that the Church of *Rome* has *openly made its advantage of;* theſe differences would have been viſible to every eye: But then your deſigne had been ſpoil'd. But you tell us, *there is a time for all things;* and ſo I perceive there is: For otherwiſe we had never been troubled with ſuch a ſpightful piece of Impertinence (not to ſay, Nonſenſe) as you have here given us.

P. 54. What you urge from *Eph.* 4. amounts to no more than a Negative

tive Argument, and ſo deſerves not to be conſider'd. And to the reſt of that Paragraph, I think enough has been ſaid already.

You ſay: *Commonwealths, or Civil Societies and Governments, if you will believe the judicious Mr.* Hooker, *are as St.* Peter *calls them* (1. *Pet.* 2. 13.) ἀνθρωπίνη κτίσις, *the contrivance and inſtitution of man*, &c. ('Tis well for St. *Peter*, that he has the *judicious Mr.* Hooker on his ſide: For it ſeems, we ſhould not otherwiſe have ſo much reaſon to believe him.) *And in all Societies inſtituted by man, the Ends of them can be no other than what the Inſtitutors appointed.* But here you may conſider, that as St. *Peter* calls (not *Commonwealths*, or *Civil Societies*, as you ſay, but thoſe who adminiſter the Government of them, *viz.*) the *King*, or *Emperour*, and *Governours ſent by him*, ἀνθρωπίνην κτίσιν, which you render the *Contrivance and Inſtitution of man:* So St. *Paul* teaches us that the Supreme Powers are ὑπὸ τῦ θεῦ τεταγμέναι, *order'd, diſpoſed*, or *ſet in their places by God:* That they are accordingly ἡ τῦ θεῦ διαταγὴ, the *Diſpoſition*, or *Ordinance of God:* And that they *bear the Sword*, and *puniſh them that do evil*, as the *Miniſters of God*, i. e. as *appointed* and *commiſſion'd* by him ſo to do: For how they can be his *Miniſters*, for that, or any other purpoſe, without his appointment and Commiſſion, is not to be underſtood. So that, if you will believe the *Scriptures*, the *Civil Powers*, or, if you pleaſe, *Civil Society* and *Government* are ſo the *Contrivance and Inſtitution of Man*, as to be withall the *Ordinance and Inſtitution of God.* P. 54. Rom. 13. 1. Verſ. 2. Verſ. 4.

And as to the *judicious Mr.* Hooker (as you juſtly call him,) if you would have it thought, that he ſo referrs Civil Society and Publick Government to the *Contrivance and Inſtitution of Man*, as either to exclude *God Almighty* from having any hand in it, or to leave men to their choice, whether they will live in ſuch Society or not, or for what Ends they will enter into it: The leaſt that can be ſaid is, that you do very much miſtake him. For though he aſſerts, that all Publick Regiment aroſe from *deliberate Advice, Conſultation, and Compoſition between men, judging it convenient and behoveful; there being no impoſſibility in Nature conſider'd by it ſelf, but that men might have lived without any Publick Regiment:* And that, as to the *kinds* of Regiment, *Nature ties not to any one, but leaves the choice as a thing arbitrary:* Yet he aſſerts withall expreſly, that we are *naturally induced to ſeek Communion and Fellowſhip with others;* and that *this was the cauſe of men's uniting themſelves at firſt in Politick Societies;* and that, *the corruption of our nature being preſuppoſed, we may not deny, but that the Law of Nature does now re-* Eccl. Pol. lib. 1. §. 10.

require of necessity some kind of Regiment. By which it appears, that how much soever he allows, in respect of the particular Forms of Commonwealths, or Kinds of Government, to the *Choice* and *Contrivance* of *Man*; he derives *Civil Society* and *Government* in general, from *Nature*, and the *Law of Nature*, and so from *God*, the Author of that Law.

Now if according to the *Scriptures*, and even to the *judicious Mr.* Hooker, *God* is the Author and *Institutor* of Civil Society in general; then the *Ends* of it, as your self must grant, can be no other than what *He* has appointed: and all that is left to the Choice and Contrivance of Man, is onely the framing and modelling Commonwealths, and the Government of them, as Prudence shall direct, for the better attaining the Ends which He has fix'd and prescribed.

You say St. *Peter* shews, in the place you referr to, *for what End Commonwealths are instituted*, viz. *for the punishment of evil-doers, and the praise of them that do well.* But you say you do not find any where, *that it is for the punishment of those who are not in Church-Communion with the Magistrate.* Nor do I any where say it is. But if rejecting the true Religion, or declining the Communion of the Church of God, be *doing evil*; then they that do so, are *Evil-doers:* and then you see what you get by St. *Peter*'s words.

But you say you are *sure the Ends of Commonwealths, appointed by the Institutors of them, could not be their Spiritual and Eternal Interests.* But why not, if their Spiritual and Eternal Interests may be promoted by Political Government, as I think I have shewn they may? Why, you say, *they cannot stipulate about these one with another*, (which I suppose you explain by the following words) *nor submit this Interest to the Power of the Society, or any Sovereign they should set over it.* Very true, Sir: But they can submit to be punish'd in their Temporal Interests, if they despise or neglect those greater Interests. Which is all they need to do.

The News you tell us here from the *West-Indies*, of *Commonwealths* there, wherein, *in time of Peace, no body has any Authority* over any of the Members of them, is indeed very wonderful and surprizing. For I confess I thought before, that there could be no *Commonwealth*, without Government; nor Government, without *Authority* in some body, over those who are to be govern'd.

P. 55. *To conclude*, my *Argument*, you tell me, *has that defect in it, which turns it upon* my self: Because *the procuring, and advancing the Spiritual and Eternal Interest of Souls*, my way, *is not a Benefit to the So-*

Society, but proper to do more harm than good, as you ſay you have proved already. Of which I ſhall leave the Reader to judge, by what has been ſaid to that matter.

My ſaying, that to argue, as the Author does, that *the Civil Power neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the Salvation of Souls, becauſe the Care of Souls is not committed to the Civil Magiſtrate, more than to other men,* is onely *to prove the thing by its ſelf,* is undoubtedly true in the ſenſe of the word *extended* which I there take it in. However, you ſee I did not inſiſt upon the matter, but was content to *let it paſs.* And if I did not rightly apprehend what the Author means by that word in that place, I think I may be excuſed, ſince you were forced to go eleven Pages further to diſcover it. A. p. 19. L. p. 7. P. 56.

As to your next Paragraph, I think I might now wholly paſs it over. I ſhall onely tell you, that as I have often *heard,* ſo I hope I ſhall always hear of *Religion eſtabliſh'd by Law.* For though the Magiſtrate's Authority can *add no force or ſanction to any Religion, whether true or falſe, nor any thing to the Truth or Validity of his own, or any Religion whatſoever;* yet I think it may do much toward the *upholding* and *preſerving* the *true* Religion, within his Juriſdiction; and in that reſpect may properly enough be ſaid to *eſtabliſh* it. P. 56, 57.

It remains now, you ſay, *to examine, whether the Author's Argument will not hold good, even againſt Puniſhments in* my *way.* And to ſhew that it will, thus you diſcourſe: *If the Magiſtrate's Authority be, as you here ſay,* 'Onely to procure all his Subjects the 'means of diſcovering the way of Salvation, and to procure with-'all, as much as in him lies, that none remain ignorant of it, or 'refuſe to embrace it, either for want of uſing thoſe means, or by 'reaſon of any ſuch Prejudices as may render them ineffectual. *If this be the Magiſtrates buſineſs, in reference to all his Subjects; I deſire you, or any man elſe, to tell me how this can be done, by the application of Force onely to a part of them; Unleſs you will ſtill vainly ſuppoſe ignorance, negligence, or prejudice, onely amongſt that part which any where differs from the Magiſtrate.* But how little to the purpoſe this Requeſt of yours is, will quickly appear. For if the Magiſtrate provides ſufficiently for the inſtruction of all his Subjects in the true Religion; and then requires them all, under convenient Penalties, to hearken to the Teachers and Miniſters of it, and to profeſs and exerciſe it with one accord, under their direction, in Publick Aſſemblies: Is there any pretenſe to ſay, that P. 57, 58. A. p. 21.

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in ſo doing he applies Force *onely to a part* of his Subjects; when the Law is general, and excepts none? 'Tis true, the Magiſtrate inflicts the Penalties in that caſe, onely upon them that break the Law. But is that the thing you mean by his *applying Force onely to a part of his Subjects?* Would you have him puniſh all, indifferently? them that obey the Law, as well as them that do not?

As to *Ignorance*, *Negligence* and *Prejudice*, I deſire you, or any man elſe, to tell me what better courſe can be taken to cure them, than that which I have mention'd. For if after all that God's Miniſters, and the Magiſtrate can do, ſome will ſtill remain *ignorant*, *negligent*, or *prejudiced;* I do not take that to be any diſparagement to it: For certainly that is a very extraordinary Remedy, which infallibly cures all diſeas'd perſons to whom it is applied.

P. 58, 59. A.p.20,21. *But*, ſay you, *if you ſay, as you do, That the Magiſtrate has Authority to lay ſuch Penalties upon thoſe who refuſe to embrace the Doctrine of the proper Miniſters of Religion, and to ſubmit to their Spiritual Government, as to make them bethink themſelves ſo as not to be alienated from the Truth: Againſt that alſo the Author's Argument holds, That the Magiſtrate has no ſuch Authority.* 1. *Becauſe God never gave the Magiſtrate an Authority to be Judge of Truth for another man in matters of Religion: and ſo he cannot be Judge whether any man be alienated from the Truth or no.* 2. *Becauſe the Magiſtrate had never authority given him to lay any Penalties on thoſe who refuſe to embrace the Doctrine of the proper Miniſters of his Religion* (*or of any other*) *or to ſubmit to their Spiritual Government, more than any other men.* Which latter Reaſon, as far as it reſpects the *true Religion* (and I am no farther concern'd in it) is the very thing in queſtion between us, and therefore ought not to be offer'd as a Reaſon. But as to the other, I grant that God never gave the Magiſtrate any Authority to be *Judge of Truth for another man*, or to preſcribe to him what he ſhall believe (for that I take to be your meaning) in any *matter* whatſoever. But how does it follow from thence, that he cannot be Judge whether any man be *alienated from the Truth*, or no? Can no man be Judge of that, unleſs he have Authority to be Judge of Truth *for other men*, or to preſcribe to them what they ſhall believe? *Rectum eſt index ſui, & obliqui.* And certainly whoever does but know the *Truth*, may eaſily judge whether other men be *alienated* from it, or no. And therefore if the Magiſtrate knows the Truth; though he has no authority to judge of Truth for other men; yet he may be Judge whether other men be alienated from the Truth, or no; and ſo may have Autho-

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rity to lay ſome Penalties upon thoſe whom he ſees to be ſo, to bring them to judge more ſincerely for themſelves.

To ſhew that *the Care of Souls is not committed to the Civil Magiſtrate, any more than to other men*, the Author endeavours to prove that it is neither committed to him *by God*, nor *by the People*. Now in my *Anſwer*, I think I ſhew that he fails as to both theſe Points; ſo that whether we ſay the Care of Souls is committed to the Magiſtrate *by God*, or that it is veſted in him by the *conſent of the People*, either of theſe Aſſertions may be true, for any thing he has ſaid to prove the contrary. Particularly, whereas he ſays, that no ſuch Power (as the Care of Souls committed to the Magiſtrate implies) can be veſted in the Magiſtrate by the conſent of the People, *becauſe no man can ſo far abandon the care of his own Salvation, as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether Prince or Subject, to preſcribe to him what Faith or Worſhip he ſhall embrace*: To this I anſwer, 'That as the Power of the Magiſtrate 'in reference to Religion (or the Salvation of Souls) is ordain'd 'for the bringing men to take ſuch care as they ought of their Sal-'vation, that they may not blindly leave it to the choice, neither 'of any other Perſon, nor yet of their own Luſts and Paſſions, to 'preſcribe to them what Faith or Worſhip they ſhall embrace: So 'if we ſuppoſe this Power to be veſted in the Magiſtrate by the 'conſent of the People; this will not import their abandoning the 'care of their Salvation, but rather the contrary. And ſo I proceed to ſhew that it is every man's *intereſt*, in reſpect of his Salvation, that the Magiſtrate ſhould have ſuch a Power committed to him. Now what exception do you make to this? Why, you ſay *this is a pleaſant Anſwer*; and you deſire me to conſider, 1. *Whether it be not pleaſant that I ſay the Power of the Magiſtrate is ordain'd to bring men to take ſuch care; and thence infer, Then it is every man's Intereſt to veſt ſuch Power in the Magiſtrate?* Well, Sir; I have conſider'd this, but can by no means diſcern where the *Pleaſantneſs* of it lies. For if the Power I ſpeak of, be of ſuch a nature as I have repreſented it; it will follow unavoidably, not onely that the People may veſt it in the Magiſtrate without *abandoning the care of their Salvation*, or *leaving it blindly to the choice of another to preſcribe to them what Faith or Worſhip they ſhall embrace*; but likewiſe, that it is every one's *Intereſt* (ſuppoſing it in his power) to veſt it in him.

L. p. 7.

A p. 21, 22.

P. 59.

But you are pleas'd to aſſiſt me in your next words: *For*, ſay you, *if it be the Power of the Magiſtrate, it is his. And what*

P. 60.

need the People veſt it in him; unleſs there be need, and it be the beſt courſe they can take, to veſt a Power in the Magiſtrate, which he has already? So that herein, it ſeems, lies the *Pleaſantneſs* of what I ſay. But what a miſerable Cavil is this! For cannot I enquire, whence the Magiſtrate receives his Power; without ſuppoſing it his, before he receives it? Or cannot I ſay, that the Power of the Magiſtrate is ſuch in the nature of it, that if we ſuppoſe it veſted in him by the conſent of the People, this will not import their *abandoning the care of their Salvation*, but rather the contrary, becauſe it is the Intereſt of the People (ſuppoſing it in their power) to veſt ſuch a Power in him: Cannot I ſay this, without implying that the Magiſtrate has this Power *already*, before the People have veſted it in him? What pretenſe can any man have to affirm this? eſpecially conſidering, that my words do ſo plainly tend, as any man may ſee, to ſhew that the Power which I claim for the Magiſtrate, does therefore belong to him, becauſe it is veſted in him either by God, or by the People: As it may be by either, for any thing the Author, or your ſelf have ſaid to the contrary.

P. 60. 2. Another *pleaſant thing* which you tell me I here ſay, is, That *the Power of the Magiſtrate is to bring men to ſuch a care of their Salvation that they may not blindly leave it to the choice of any perſon, or of their own luſts and paſſions, to preſcribe to them what Faith or Worſhip they ſhall embrace; And yet that 'tis their beſt courſe to veſt a Power in the Magiſtrate, liable to the ſame luſts and paſſions as themſelves, to chooſe for them.* But where, I beſeech you, do I ſay, that it is the People's *beſt courſe to veſt a Power in the Magiſtrate to chooſe for them?* That you do not pretend to ſhew: but inſtead of it, you ſay, *If they veſt a Power in the Magiſtrate to puniſh them when they diſſent from his Religion, to bring them to act, even againſt their own Inclination, according to Reaſon and ſound Judgement; or to bring them to conſider Reaſons and Arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them: How far is this from leaving it to the choice of another man to preſcribe to them what Faith or Worſhip they ſhall embrace?* Which is juſt nothing to your purpoſe. For I ſpeak not of the *Magiſtrate's Religion*, but of the *true Religion*, and that propoſed with ſufficient Evidence of the Truth of it. And if the People do onely veſt a Power in the Magiſtrate, to puniſh them when they reject that Religion ſo propoſed, to bring them to act *according to Reaſon* and *ſound Judgement*, &c. I think that is far enough from leaving it to the choice of another man, to preſcribe to them what Faith or Worſhip they ſhall embrace.

But

But it ſeems you have not done with this yet. For you ſay you *do neither me nor the Magiſtrate Injury, when you ſay that the Power I give the Magiſtrate, of puniſhing men to make them conſider Reaſons and Arguments proper and ſufficient to convince them, is to convince them of the truth of his Religion* (whatever that be) *and to bring them to it.* Which ſeems a little ſtrange, and *pleaſant* too. But thus you prove it: *For men will never, in his opinion, act according to Reaſon and ſound Judgement, till they embrace his Religion. And if you have the brow of an honeſt man, you will not ſay the Magiſtrate will ever puniſh you to bring you to conſider any other Reaſons and Arguments but ſuch as are proper to convince you of the truth of his Religion, and to bring you to that.* Which (beſides the pleaſant talk of ſuch *Reaſons and Arguments as are proper and ſufficient to convince men of the truth of the Magiſtrate's Religion*, though it be a falſe one) is juſt as much as to ſay, It is ſo, becauſe in the *Magiſtrate's opinion* it is ſo; and becauſe it is not to be expected that he will act againſt his *opinion.* As if the Magiſtrate's Opinion could change the nature of things, and turn a Power to promote the true Religion, into a Power to promote a falſe one. No, Sir: The Magiſtrate's Opinion has no ſuch virtue. It may indeed keep him from exerciſing the Power he has to promote the true Religion; and it may lead him to abuſe the pretenſe of it, to the promoting a Falſe one: But it can neither deſtroy that Power, nor make it any thing but what it is. And therefore whatever the Magiſtrate's *Opinion* be, his *Power* was given him (as the Apoſtles Power was to them) *for edification* onely, *not for deſtruction*: And it may always be ſaid of him (what St. *Paul* ſaid of himſelf) that he *can do nothing againſt the Truth, but for the Truth.* And therefore if the Magiſtrate puniſhes me, to bring me to a Falſe Religion; it is not his *Opinion* that will excuſe him, when he comes to anſwer for it to his Judge. For certainly men are as accountable for their Opinions (thoſe of them, I mean, which influence their Practice) as they are for their Actions. P. 60, 61:

Here is therefore no *ſhifting forwards and backwards*, as you pretend; nor any *Circle*, but in your own Imagination. For though it be true that I ſay *The Magiſtrate has no Power to puniſh men, to compell them to his Religion*; yet I no where ſay, nor will it follow from any thing I do ſay, That he has Power *to compell them to conſider Reaſons and Arguments proper to convince them of the truth of* his *Religion.* But I do not much wonder that you endeavour to put this upon me. For I think by this time it is pret-

ey plain, that otherwiſe you would have but little to ſay: And it is *an art very much in uſe among ſome ſort of Learned Men*, when they cannot confute what an Adverſary does ſay, to make him ſay what he does not; that they may have ſomething which they can confute.

P. 61. Your next Paragraph runs high, and charges me with nothing leſs than *Prevarication*. For whereas, as you tell me, I ſpeak of it here as the moſt deplorable Condition imaginable, that men ſhould be left to themſelves, and not be forced to conſider and examine the Grounds of their Religion, and ſearch impartially and diligently after the Truth, &c. It ſeems all the *Remedy* I offer is no more than this, *Diſſenters muſt be puniſh'd*. Upon which thus you inſult: *Can any body that hears you ſay ſo, believe you in earneſt; and that want of Examination is the thing you would have amended, when want of Examination is not the thing you would have puniſh'd? ——But if in all your Treatiſe you can ſhew me one place where you ſay that the Ignorant, the Careleſs, the Inconſiderate, the negligent in examining, &c. are to be puniſh'd, I will allow your Remedy for a good one. But you have not ſaid any thing like this; and which is more, I tell you beforehand you dare not ſay it. And whilſt you do not, the World has reaſon to judge, that however want of Examination be a general Fault, which you with great vehemency have exaggerated; yet you uſe it only for a pretenſe to puniſh Diſſenters; and either diſtruſt your Remedy, or elſe care not to have it generally cured.* Now here I acknowledge, that though want or neglect of Examination be a general Fault, yet the Method I propoſe for curing it, does not reach to all that are guilty of it, but is limited to thoſe who reject the true Religion, propoſed to them with ſufficient Evidence. But then to let you ſee how little ground you have to ſay that I *prevaricate* in this matter, I ſhall onely deſire you to conſider, what it is that the Author and my ſelf were enquiring after. For it is not, What courſe is to be taken to *confirm* and eſtabliſh thoſe in the Truth, who have already embraced it: Nor, How they may be enabled to *propagate* it to others: (For both which purpoſes I have already acknowledged it very uſeful, and a thing much to be deſired, that all ſuch perſons ſhould, as far as they are able, ſearch into the Grounds upon which their Religion ſtands, and challenges their belief:) But the Subject of our enquiry is onely, What Method is to be uſed, to *bring* men to the true Religion. Now if this be the onely thing we were enquiring after, (as you cannot deny it to be;) then every one ſees that in ſpeaking to this

this Point, I had nothing to do with any who have already embraced the true Religion; because they are not to be *brought* to that Religion, but onely to be *confirm'd* and *edified* in it; but was onely to consider how those who *reject* it, may be brought to embrace it. So that how much soever any of those who own the true Religion, may be guilty of neglect of Examination; 'tis evident, I was onely concern'd to shew how it may be *cured* in those, who, by reason of it, reject the true Religion, duly proposed or tender'd to them. And certainly to confine my self to this, is not to *prevaricate*, unless to keep within the bounds which the Question under debate prescribes me, be to prevaricate.

In telling me therefore that I *dare not say that the Ignorant, the Careless, the Inconsiderate, the negligent in examining, &c.* (i. e. *all* that are such) *are to be punish'd*, you onely tell me that I *dare* not be impertinent. And therefore I hope you will excuse me, if I take no notice of the three *Reasons* you offer in your next Page, for your saying so. And yet if I had had a mind to talk impertinently; I know not why I might not have *dared* to do so, as well as other men.

There is one thing more in this Paragraph, which though nothing more pertinent than the rest, I shall not wholly pass over. It lies in these words: *He that reads your Treatise with attention, will be more confirm'd in this Opinion* (*viz.* That I use want of Examination onely for a pretense to punish Dissenters, *&c.*) *when he shall find, that you* (*who are so earnest to have men punish'd, to bring them to consider and examine, that so they may discover the way of Salvation*) *have not said one word of considering, searching, and hearkening to the Scripture; which had been as good a Rule for a Christian to have sent them to, as to Reasons and Arguments proper to convince them of you know not what*, &c. How this *confirms* that Opinion, I do not see; nor have you thought fit to instruct me. But as to the thing it self, *viz.* my *not saying one word of considering, searching, and hearkening to the Scripture*, whatever advantage a captious Adversary may imagine he has in it, I hope it will not seem strange to any indifferent and judicious Person, who shall but consider that throughout my Treatise, I speak of the true Religion onely in *general*, i. e. not as limited to any particular Dispensation, or to the Times of the *Scriptures*; but as reaching from the fall of *Adam* to the end of the World; and so comprehending the Times which preceeded the Scriptures; wherein yet God *left not himself without witness*, but furnished Mankind with sufficient means of know-

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ing Him and his Will, in order to their eternal Salvation. For I appeal to all Men of Art, whether, ſpeaking of the true Religion under this generality, I could be allowed to deſcend to any ſuch *Rules* of it, as belong only to ſome particular Times, or Diſpenſations: Such as you cannot but acknowledge the *Old* and *New Teſtaments* to be.

P. 64. You ſay that, Page 26. of my *Anſwer*, *out of abundant kindneſs, when the Diſſenters have their Heads* (*without any cauſe*) *broken, I provide them a Plaiſter.* But whoever ſhall conſider the Penalties I there ſpeak of, will, I perſwade my ſelf, find no *Heads broken*, and ſo but little need of a *Plaiſter*.

But having ſaid there, 'That the Power I aſſcribe to the Ma-'giſtrate, is given him to bring men, not to his own, but to the 'true Religion: And, That though (as our Author puts us in mind) '*the Religion of every Prince is Orthodox to himſelf*; yet if this 'Power keep within it's bounds (*i. e.* if the Penalties the Magiſtrate makes uſe of to promote a Falſe Religion, do not exceed the meaſure of thoſe which he may warrantably uſe for the promoting the True,) 'it can ſerve the intereſt of no other Religion but 'the True, among ſuch as have any concern for their eternal Sal-'vation; (and they that have none, deſerve not to be conſider'd:) 'becauſe the Penalties it enables him that has it to inflict, are 'not ſuch as may tempt ſuch perſons either to renounce a Religion 'which they believe to be true, or to profeſs one which they do 'not believe to be ſo; but onely ſuch as are apt to put them 'upon a ſerious and impartial Examination of the Controver-'ſy between the Magiſtrate and them: which is the way for 'them to come to the knowledge of the Truth: I add theſe words; 'And if upon ſuch examination of the matter, they 'chance to find that the Truth does not lie on the Magiſtrate's 'ſide; they have gain'd thus much however, even by the Magi-'ſtrate's miſapplying his Power, that they know better than they 'did before, where the Truth does lie, *&c.* (Which is the *Plaiſter* you ſpeak of.) Now this you tell me is as true as if I ſhould ſay, *Upon Examination I find ſuch a one is out of the way to York; therefore I know better than I did before, that I am in the right.* Where I ſhall only obſerve, that if you had put it, *Therefore I know better than I did before, where the right way does lie*, your Inference had run exactly parallel with mine. But then it would have been true too; which was not for your purpoſe.

P. 64. You ſay, *He that has been puniſhed, may have examined before*; *and*

and then, you tell me, I am *ſure he gains nothing*. Right, Sir. But neither does he loſe much, if it be true, which I there add, 'That all the hurt that befalls him, is, onely the ſuffering ſome 'tolerable Inconveniencies, for his following *the Light of his own 'Reaſon, and the Dictates of his own Conſcience*.

But you go on, and ſay, *However, you think you do well to encourage the Magiſtrate in puniſhing, and comfort the man who has ſuffer'd unjuſtly, by ſhewing what he ſhall gain by it. Whereas, on the contrary, in a Diſcourſe of this nature, where the bounds of Right and Wrong are enquired into, and ſhould be eſtabliſh'd, the Magiſtrate was to be ſhew'd the bounds of his Authority, and warn'd of the injury he did when he miſapplies his Power, and puniſh'd any man who deſerv'd it not; and not be ſooth'd into injuſtice, by conſideration of gain that might thence accrue to the Sufferer. Shall we do evil that good may come of it? There are a ſort of People who are very wary of touching upon the Magiſtrate's duty, and tender of ſhewing the bounds of his Power, and the injuſtice and ill conſequences of his miſapplying it; at leaſt, ſo long as it is miſapplied in favour of them, and their Party.* As to what you ſay here of the *nature* of my *Diſcourſe*, I ſhall onely put you in mind, that the Queſtion there debated is, Whether the Magiſtrate has any Right or Authority to uſe Force for the promoting the *true* Religion. Which plainly *ſuppoſes* the Unlawfulneſs and Injuſtice of uſing Force to promote a falſe Religion, as granted on both ſides. So that I could no way be obliged to take notice of it in my *Diſcourſe*, but onely as occaſion ſhould be offer'd. P. 64, 65.

And whether I have not *ſhew'd the bounds of the Magiſtrate's Authority*, as far as I was any way obliged to do it, let any indifferent Perſon judge. But to talk here of a *ſort of People who are very wary of touching upon the Magiſtrate's duty, and tender of ſhewing the bounds of his Power*, where I tell the Magiſtrate that the Power I aſcribe to him in reference to Religion, is given him to bring men, *not to his own, but to the true Religion*; and that he *miſapplies* it, when he endeavours to promote a falſe Religion by it, is, methinks, at leaſt a little unſeaſonable.

Nor am I any more concern'd in what you ſay of the Magiſtrate's miſapplying his Power *in favour of a Party*. For as you have not yet proved that his applying his Power to the promoting the true Religion (which is all that I contend for) is *miſapplying* it; ſo much leſs can you prove it to be *miſapplying it in favour of a Party*.

But that I *encourage the Magiſtrate in puniſhing men to bring them*

to a falſe Religion (for that is the *puniſhing* we here ſpeak of) and *ſooth him into Injuſtice, by ſhewing what thoſe who ſuffer unjuſtly ſhall gain by it*, when in the very ſame breath I tell him that by ſo puniſhing he *miſapplies his Power*, is a Diſcovery which I believe none but your ſelf could have made. When I ſay that the Magiſtrate *miſapplies his Power* by ſo puniſhing; I ſuppoſe all other men underſtand me to ſay, that he *ſins* in doing it, and layes himſelf open to divine vengeance by it. And can he be *encouraged* to this, by hearing what others may *gain* by what (without Repentance) muſt coſt him ſo dear? 'Tis true indeed, the Apoſtate Emperour (who yet, by the way, was *for* Toleration, and talk'd much of his φιλανθρωπια) pretended to take encouragement from ſome of the Promiſes of the Goſpel, to ſpoil and impoveriſh Chriſtians, in conſideration of what they would *gain by it*. But every one ſees that this was no more than Pretenſe and Mockery, in one who believed nothing of thoſe Promiſes, but only intended to ridicule and expoſe them. But had he believed the Promiſes made to Chriſtians, he would have believed the Threats likewiſe which the Goſpel denounces againſt their Perſecutors. And can any man think he would have been ſo mad, as to deprive them of their Goods and Poſſeſſions, that they might *gain* the *Kingdome of Heaven*, when he knew that he ſhould himſelf get nothing in the end but damnation by it?

Julianus *Imp. Epiſt.* 43. *edit.* Petav.

P. 65. But you ſay, and you undertake to prove, that *this Miſchief* (viz. the Magiſtrate's *miſapplying his Power*) *upon* my *Principle, joyn'd to the natural thirſt in man after Arbitrary Power, may be carried to all manner of exorbitancy, with ſome pretenſe of Right*. Well, Sir; though I do not think my ſelf bound to take notice of all that may be done *with ſome pretenſe of Right*; yet, however, let us ſee how you go about to prove this. *Thus*, ſay you, *ſtands your Syſtem. If Force*, i. e. *Puniſhment, may be any way uſeful for the promoting the Salvation of Souls, there is a Right ſomewhere to uſe it. And this Right is in the Magiſtrate. Who then, upon your grounds, may quickly find reaſon, where it ſuits his inclination, or ſerves his turn, to puniſh men directly to bring them to his Religion. For if he may uſe Force, becauſe it may be, indirectly, and at a diſtance, any way, uſeful towards the Salvation of Souls, towards the procuring any degree of Glory; Why may he not, by the ſame Rule, uſe it where it may be uſeful, at leaſt indirectly, and at a diſtance, towards the procuring a greater degree of Glory? For St.* Paul *aſſures us, that the Afflictions of this life work for us a far more exceeding weight of Glo-*

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ry. So that why ſhould they not be puniſh'd, if in the wrong, to bring them into the right way; If in the right, to make them by their Sufferings gainers of a far more exceeding weight of Glory? But as prettily as this looks, I fear, if it be examined, it will not be found ſufficient to prove even that little which you pretend to prove by it.

For, *firſt*, you muſt give me leave to ask you once more, Where I ſay, *If Force may be any way uſeful for the promoting the Salvation of Souls, there is a Right ſomewhere to uſe it?* For in the Page you referr to, the words are 'If there be ſo great Uſe and Ne-'ceſſity of outward Force for the promoting true Religion, and 'the Salvation of Souls, &c. Nor do I any where ſpeak otherwiſe, that I know.

But, *ſecondly*, let it be ſuppoſed if you pleaſe, that I ſay what you ſo often tell me I do, though I do not: Yet even ſo, unleſs it be as *neceſſary* for men to attain any *greater degree* of Glory, as it is to attain *Glory*, it will not follow, that if the Magiſtrate may uſe Force, becauſe it may be indirectly, *&c.* uſeful towards the procuring *any degree* of Glory, he may by the ſame Rule, uſe it where it may be in that manner uſeful towards the procuring a *greater degree* of Glory. But that there is the ſame Neceſſity of men's attaining a *greater degree* of Glory, as there is of their attaining *Glory*, no man will affirm. For without attaining *Glory*, they cannot eſcape the damnation of Hell: which yet they may eſcape, without attaining any *greater degree* of Glory. So that the attaining *Glory*, is abſolutely neceſſary: but the attaining any *greater degree* of it, however deſirable, is not *ſo* neceſſary. Now if there be not the ſame Neceſſity of the one of theſe, as there is of the other; there can be *no pretenſe* to ſay, that whatever is lawful in reſpect to the one of them, is likewiſe ſo in reſpect to the other. And therefore though St. *Paul* aſſures us that *the Afflictions of this Life work for us a far more exceeding weight of Glory*; it will not follow from thence, even *by the Rule* which you make for me, but is not mine, That *if men be in the right way, they may be puniſh'd to make them by their Sufferings gainers of a far more exceeding weight of Glory*. So that your *ſome pretenſe of Right*, which was all that in modeſty you could undertake to prove, comes at laſt to juſt none at all.

But how unfortunate was I, to talk of the Magiſtrate's *miſapplying his Power, when he puniſhes thoſe who have the Right on their ſide!* For by granting that, it ſeems I *grant all that the Author* p. 66.

contends

contends for, and ſo give up the Cauſe I undertook to defend. So you tell me, Sir: and thus you think you prove what you ſay. *For*, ſay you, *if the Magiſtrate miſapplies, or makes a wrong uſe of his Power, when he puniſhes in matters of Religion any one who is in the Right, though it be but to make him conſider; he alſo miſapplies his Power, when he puniſhes any one, whomſoever in Matters of Religion, to make him conſider.* Which is certainly as wonderful a Collection as any you make in your whole Letter: As any man may ſee, that will but compare the Magiſtrate's *puniſhing in Matters of Religion any one who is in the Right to make him conſider*, with his *puniſhing any one whomſoever* (*i. e.* any one who is in the Wrong) *in matters of Religion, to make him conſider.*

For, firſt, to puniſh one who is *in the Right*, is to puniſh one who does not *deſerve* to be puniſh'd; which is manifeſtly unjuſt, whatever the end be for which he is puniſh'd. But to puniſh one who is in the *Wrong*, and refuſes to conſider what may convince him of the Right, (and ſuch onely are the perſons whom I would have puniſh'd,) is onely to puniſh one who well *deſerves* to be puniſh'd; which no man can pretend to be unjuſt.

Again; To puniſh one who is *in the Right*, to make him conſider what may ſhew him the Right, and move him to embrace it (which is the thing we mean here by *conſidering*,) is vain and ridiculous; becauſe he does already diſcern and embrace the Right, and therefore *needs* not be made conſider, to bring him to embrace it. But to puniſh one who is in the Wrong, and can by no other means be prevail'd upon to conſider what may manifeſt the Right to him; I ſay, to puniſh ſuch a one to make him conſider, is but reaſonable and neceſſary; becauſe it is *neceſſary* for him to *conſider*, and Puniſhment is *neceſſary* to bring him to conſider.

Now if theſe Caſes are ſo widely different: If in the firſt of them, the Magiſtrate puniſhes where there is neither any *deſert*, nor any *need*, or *uſe* of Puniſhment; but in the other, he puniſhes where Puniſhment is both *deſerv'd*, and *neceſſary* to be inflicted: Is there any imaginable ground to ſay, That if the Magiſtrate miſapplies, or makes a wrong uſe of his Power, in the firſt Caſe, he does ſo likewiſe in the other?

Yes, you think there is. *For*, ſay you, *every one is here Judge for himſelf, what is Right; And in matters of Faith, and Religious Worſhip, another cannot judge for him. So that to puniſh any one in matters of Religion, though it be but to make him conſider, is by your own Confeſſion, beyond the Magiſtrate's Power. And that puniſh-*

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ing in matters of Religion is beyond the Magiſtrate's Power, is (τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι) *what the Author contends for.* Which *Demonſtration* of yours, if I may have leave to put it into form, ſtands thus:

'Whoever takes upon him to judge for another, what is 'Right in matters of Religion, takes upon him to do what 'no man can do.

'But whoever puniſhes any man in matters of Religion, to 'make him conſider, takes upon him to judge for another, 'what is Right in matters of Religion.

'Therefore whoever puniſhes any one in Matters of Religion, 'to make him conſider, takes upon him to do what no man 'can do: and conſequently miſapplies his Power of puniſhing, 'if he has that Power.

Where if the Second Propoſition were as evidently true, as the Firſt is; I ſhould readily admit the Concluſion, as ſufficiently demonſtrated. But if that Propoſition be ſo far from being evidently true, that, on the contrary, it is certainly falſe, and plainly involves a Contradiction in it; then you muſt give me ſome better proof of the Concluſion, before I ſhall be obliged to aſſent to it. Now (a little to examine that Propoſition;) Why, I beſeech you, does any one puniſh another to *make him conſider*? Is it not, that that other may *judge for himſelf*, of what he is required to *conſider*? For as he that will *judge* of any matter, muſt firſt *conſider* it; (according to that old Rule, *Si judicas, cognoſce*:) So I know no uſe there is of *conſidering*, but in order to *judging*. And can he who puniſhes another *to make him conſider*, that he may judge *for himſelf* of the matter to be conſider'd, intend to *judge for him*, whom he puniſhes to make him *judge for himſelf*? If this be manifeſtly contradictious and impoſſible, (as it muſt be acknowledged to be;) then every one ſees that it is ſo far from being evidently true, that *whoever puniſhes any one in Matters of Religion, to make him conſider, takes upon him to judge for another what is Right in Matters of Religion*, that it is repugnant and abſurd to ſay, that any man, who puniſhes another to make him *conſider*, does at the ſame time take upon him to *judge for that perſon*, in any *matter* whatſoever.

Thus you ſee with how little reaſon you ſay, that *by granting that the Magiſtrate miſapplies his Power, when he puniſhes thoſe who have the Right on their ſide, I grant all that the Author contends for.* Indeed if I had ſaid that the Magiſtrate does *therefore*, in that Caſe, miſapply his Power, becauſe *whoever puniſhes any one in matters of Religion to make him conſider, takes upon him to judge for*

him what is Right, in matters of Religion; you had had ſome ground for what you ſay. But that is no Reaſon of mine, but an Aſſumption, or Suppoſition of yours; and a very bad one too, as I hope has been ſufficiently ſhewn.

A. p. 26, 27. My following words (which are the laſt you take notice of) are theſe: ---- 'And all the hurt that comes to them by it, is onely 'the ſuffering ſome tolerable Inconveniencies for their following 'the Light of their own Reaſon, and the Dictates of their own 'Conſciences: which certainly is no ſuch Miſchief to Mankind as 'to make it more eligible that there ſhould be no ſuch Power 'veſted in the Magiſtrate, but the care of every man's Soul ſhould 'be left to himſelf alone (as this Author demands it ſhould be:) 'That is, that every man ſhould be ſuffer'd quietly, and without 'the leaſt moleſtation, either to take no care at all of his Soul, if 'he be ſo pleas'd; or, in doing it, to follow his own groundleſs 'Prejudices, or unaccountable Humour, or any crafty Seducer, 'whom he may think fit to take for his Guide. Which words you ſet down at large: but inſtead of contradicting them, or offering to ſhew that the *Miſchief* ſpoken of, is *ſuch as makes*

P. 67. *it more eligible &c.* you onely demand, *Why ſhould not the care of every man's Soul be left to himſelf, rather than the Magiſtrate? Is the Magiſtrate like to be more concern'd for it? Is the Magiſtrate like to take more care of it?* &c. As if not to leave the care of every man's Soul to *himſelf alone*, were, as you expreſs it afterwards, to *take the care of men's Souls from themſelves:* Or as if to veſt a Power in the Magiſtrate, to procure as much as in him lies (*i. e.* as far as it can be procured by convenient Penalties) that men take ſuch care of their Souls as they ought to do, were to leave the care of their Souls *to the Magiſtrate, rather than to themſelves:* Which no man but your ſelf will imagine. I acknowledge as freely as you can do, that as every man is more concern'd than any man elſe can be, ſo he is likewiſe more obliged, to take care of his Soul; and that no man can by any means be diſcharged of the care of his Soul; which, when all is done, will never be ſaved but by his own care of it. But do I contradict any thing of this, when I ſay, that the care of every man's Soul ought not to be left to *himſelf alone?* or, that it is the Intereſt of Mankind, that the *Magiſtrate* be entruſted and obliged to take care, as far as lies in him, that no man neglect his own Soul? I thought, I confeſs, that every man was in ſome ſort charged with the care of his *Neighbour*'s Soul. But in your way of reaſoning, he that affirms

affirms this, takes away the care of every man's Soul from *himself*, and leaves it to his *Neighbour*, rather than to himself. But if this be plainly abſurd; as every one ſees it is; then ſo it muſt be likewiſe, to ſay, that he that veſts ſuch a Power as we here ſpeak of in the Magiſtrate, *takes away the care of mens Souls from themſelves*, and places it in the *Magiſtrate*, *rather than in themſelves*.

What trifling then is it, to ſay here, *If you cannot lay your hand upon your Heart, and ſay all this* (*viz.* that the Magiſtrate is *like to be more concern'd for other men's Souls, than themſelves*, &c.) *What then will be got by the change?* For 'tis plain, here is no ſuch *change* as you would inſinuate; but the care of Souls which I aſſert to the Magiſtrate, is ſo far from diſcharging any man of the care of his own Soul, or leſſening his obligation to it, that it ſerves to no other purpoſe in the world, but to bring men, who otherwiſe would not, to conſider and do what the Intereſt of their Souls obliges them to.

'Tis therefore manifeſt, that the thing here to be conſider'd, is not, Whether the Magiſtrate be *like to be more concern'd for other men's Souls*, or *to take more care of them, than themſelves*: nor, Whether he be *commonly more careful of his own Soul, than other men are of theirs*: nor, Whether he be *leſs expoſed*, in matters of Religion, *to Prejudices, Humours, and crafty Seducers, than other men*: nor yet, Whether he be not *more in danger to be in the wrong, than other men, in regard that he never meets with that great and onely Antidote of* mine (as you call it) *againſt Error which I here call Moleſtation*. But the Point upon which this matter turns, is onely this, Whether the Salvation of Souls, be not better provided for, if the Magiſtrate be obliged to procure, as much as in him lies, that every man take ſuch care as he ought of his Soul, than if he be not ſo obliged, but the care of every man's Soul be left to himſelf alone: Which certainly any man of common Senſe may eaſily determine. For as you will not, I ſuppoſe, deny, but God has more amply provided for the Salvation of your own Soul, by obliging your Neighbour, as well as your ſelf, to take care of it; though 'tis poſſible your Neighbour may not be *more concern'd* for it, than your ſelf; or may not be *more careful* of his own Soul, than you are of yours; or may be no leſs *expoſed*, in matters of Religion, *to Prejudices*, &c. than you are; Becauſe if you are your ſelf wanting to your own Soul, it is more likely that you will be brought to take care of it, if your Neighbour be obliged to admoniſh and exhort you to it, than if he be not; though it may

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fall out that he will not do what he is obliged to do in that caſe: So I think it cannot be denied, but the Salvation of all men's Souls is better provided for, if beſides the obligation which every man has to take care of his own Soul (and that which every man's Neighbour has likewiſe to do it) the Magiſtrate alſo be entruſted and obliged to ſee that no man neglect his Soul, then it would be, if every man were left to himſelf in this matter: Becauſe though we ſhould admit that the Magiſtrate is not *like to be*, or is not ordinarily, *more concern'd for other men's Souls, than they themſelves are, &c.* it is nevertheleſs undeniably true ſtill, that whoever neglects his Soul, is more likely to be brought to take care of it, if the Magiſtrate be obliged to do what lies in him to bring him to do it, than if he be not. Which is enough to ſhew, that it is every man's *true Intereſt*, that the care of his Soul ſhould not be left to himſelf alone, but that the Magiſtrate ſhould be ſo far entruſted with it as I contend that he is.

Having thus, Sir, as I think, conſider'd all that is material in your Letter, and a great deal more; I now *referr* it (if I may uſe
P. 67. your words) *to your ſelf, as well as to the judgement of the World, Whether the Author of the Letter*, and your ſelf, *in ſaying no Body has a Right*; or I, *in ſaying the Magiſtrate has a Right to uſe* ſome degrees of *Force in Matters of Religion, have moſt Reaſon.* If you think the advantage lies on your ſide, and ſhall do me the favour to let me know why you think ſo; I ſhall conſider what you ſay, with all the care I can uſe, and with a mind as well diſpoſed to receive Information, as your ſelf can wiſh. And if upon ſuch a conſideration of what is offer'd, I find my ſelf in an Error; I ſhall freely acknowledge my Conviction with all thankfulneſs; nor ſhall I be aſhamed even publickly to retract my Error. But if inſtead of ſatisfactory Reaſon, I meet with nothing but Sophiſtry, and unfair dealing; I am apt to think I ſhall content my ſelf with what I have already ſaid: being now ſufficiently ſenſible, that Cavils and Impertinencies are endleſs, when a Man of Parts ſhall not diſdain to make uſe of them.

P. 68. As to the *Requeſt* you leave with me, *That if ever I ſhould write again about the means of bringing Souls to Salvation, I would take care not to prejudice ſo good a Cauſe by ordering it ſo, as to make it look as if I writ for a Party*; I do not ſee what need there was of it; having given you no occaſion, that I know, to think or ſuſpect, that in anſwering the Author's *Argument*, I writ for any *Party*,

but

but *God*, and the *Souls of men*: A *Party*, which I hope I ſhall never deſert. Indeed if I had miſrepreſented the Author of the Letter, and impoſed upon him things which he never ſaid; if I had induſtriouſly ſet my ſelf to make faults where there were none; or had pretended to confute my Adverſary by what I could not but know to be falſe, or nothing to the purpoſe: In ſhort, if I had dealt with that Author, as I think it appears by this time his Defender has dealt with me; then, I confeſs, you might well have ſuſpected that I writ for ſome *other* Party. But if there be nothing of all this in my *Anſwer*, nor any thing unbecoming a man of Candour and Sincerity; as you have not yet been able to ſhew that there is: then your Suggeſtion is altogether groundleſs, and uncharitable.

What *Party* you *writ for*, when you writ your *Letter*, I will not take upon me to ſay. But I think I have too much occaſion to leave this Requeſt with you; That if ever you write again about the Subject of our Debate, you would take care to make it look, as if you *believed* what you writ to be both *pertinent* and *true*. And then, as there will be leſs ground to ſuſpect that you write for *another* Party: So there will be this further advantage by it, that a great deal leſs Paper will ſerve your turn.

Sir, I am

Feb. 21.
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Your moſt humble Servant.

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